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The Department of State

bulletin

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President Truman and Prime Minister Plevin Confer on Collective Security

Communiqué Issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of France, January 30, 1951¹

Since Prime Minister Plevin arrived in Washington on January 29 three meetings between the President and the Prime Minister have been held. Those who participated as advisers were:

UNITED STATES

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense
Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization
William Foster, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
Gen. Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President
Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large
David K. E. Bruce, U.S. Ambassador to France
Willard Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Thomas D. Cabot, Director Designate of International Security Affairs, Department of State
Donald R. Heath, U.S. Minister to the Associated States of Indo-China
Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Minister to France
James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Henry A. Byroade, Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State

FRANCE

Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the United States
General of the Armies Alphonse Pierre Juin, French Resident General in Morocco
Ambassador Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Deputy to the North Atlantic Council
Guillaume Guindeg, Director of the Ministry of Finance
Raoul de Vitry, French Representative to the Central Committee on Raw Materials
Tezenas de Montcel, Inspector General representing the Ministry of the Associated States
Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy
Pierre Paul Schweitzer, Financial Counselor, French Embassy
Gontran de Juniac, Counselor, French Embassy
Colonel Allard, Chief of Staff to General de Lattre de Tassigny
M. de Marranches, Aide to General Juin

¹ Released to the press by the White House January 30.

At the conclusion of their conferences, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following joint statement:

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on the broad subject of international affairs and they touched upon all the questions that are of common interest to France and the United States. Once again they found that there exists a fundamental identity of views between the two countries.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that the principle of collective security, embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, is the chief bulwark of world peace and of the independence and survival of free societies in the world. They agreed that, in conformity with this principle, aggression must not be rewarded or the menace of aggression appeased. It is in this spirit that the President and the Prime Minister examined the means to assure coordinated action and turned to the more detailed questions as set forth below.

I. Far Eastern Problems

The President and the Prime Minister found themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their security and assure their independence.

The situation in Korea was discussed and they concurred that every effort must be exerted to bring about an honorable solution there. Until that end can be accomplished, resistance by United Nations forces to aggression must continue. Both France and the United States will support action directed toward deterring aggression and toward preventing the spread of hostilities beyond Korea.

With regard to Indochina, the Prime Minister described the heavy responsibilities borne by France in that area and the great cost, both in lives and money, she has paid in resisting the Communist onslaught in order to maintain the security and independence of the Associated States, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The Prime Minister declared that France was determined to do its utmost to continue this effort. The President informed the Prime Minister that United States aid

for the French Union forces and for the National Armies of the Associated States will continue, and that the increased quantities of material to be delivered under the program authorized for the current fiscal year will be expedited.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that continuous contact should be maintained between the interested nations on these problems.

II. Problems of Europe

The President and the Prime Minister both recognized the vital importance of Europe to the defense of the entire free world. The Prime Minister described the French efforts to achieve European unity. He stressed in this regard the French desire to see disappear the divisions and rivalries that oppose a harmonious development of the European economy and the establishment of a strongly organized Europe. The Prime Minister stated that the policy of the French Government was to favor the creation of a broad European market open to competition by all through the abolition of cartels and discriminatory practices.

The President and the Prime Minister were in fundamental agreement that the cause of peace in Europe and the world would be furthered by a progressively closer integration in every aspect of a democratic Germany into a vigorous Western European community.

The Prime Minister brought the President up-to-date on the recent developments relating to the Schuman Plan treaty. He expressed appreciation for the interest and the comprehension which this plan found in the United States. The President hoped that the treaty would be concluded in satisfactory form at the earliest possible moment. The Prime Minister also mentioned that new steps are anticipated in the same direction, particularly in the field of agriculture.

The Prime Minister also referred to the conference to be convened in Paris on February 6th, to consider the formation of a European Army based on European political institutions and within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The President welcomed the conference and expressed his hope for its success. He informed the Prime Minister that the United States would be glad to accept the invitation to send an observer, and that Ambassador David Bruce would be designated.

III. Atlantic Defense Plans

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views with regard to the progress made by both countries in their defense programs. The President described to the Prime Minister the great efforts now being made by the United States. Mr. Pleven outlined the steps taken by France in this field and added that the French Government would neglect no opportunity to intensify its re-

armament and particularly to accelerate as much as possible the execution of existing programs.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their conviction that German participation in the common defense effort as envisaged last month at Brussels would strengthen the security of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

IV. Economic Problems

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed certain questions concerning United States assistance to France in the economic field. They clarified procedures so that United States assistance will make its most effective contribution to the French defense effort.

They agreed that the solution of the raw materials problems ought to be the aim, not only of national action, but also of international action undertaken with the utmost speed and vigor. The objectives of such action are to give the necessary priority to defense requirements and to meet essential civilian needs through the stimulation of production, the equitable distribution of available supplies, the avoidance of waste in nonessential uses and of unnecessary accumulation of stocks. The two Governments, together with that of the United Kingdom, are presently proposing the formation of international commodity groups which will take up immediate problems of material shortages of common concern to the countries of the free world.

They recognized the importance of dealing with the problem of inflation and rising prices, which adversely affect the common defense effort. They agreed that not only should vigorous national action be taken but that wherever international measures may effectively contribute to this objective they would give their full support.

The President and the Prime Minister wish to state that the supreme objective of the foreign policies of the United States and France is the establishment and maintenance of durable peace based on law and justice.

The measures which they have discussed and undertaken in common with other free nations for the development of adequate defense under the North Atlantic Treaty and for the development of European unity are directed solely to that end.

Moreover, the two Governments have never neglected in the past and will never neglect in the future any genuine opportunity to settle international problems by negotiation.

The discussions between the President and the Prime Minister have shown again that no menace or maneuver will succeed in shaking the fundamental unity which exists between the United States and France.

UNITY OF PURPOSE URGED FOR SECURITY OF NORTH ATLANTIC AREA

*Report of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to Members of the Congress*¹

MR. PRESIDENT, MR. SPEAKER, LADIES, AND GENTLEMEN, I am very deeply aware of the distinction implicit in the invitation to appear before the elected representatives of the people. I am also keenly aware of the responsibility that rests upon me in accepting such an invitation, a responsibility that is not, of course, easy to discharge.

The very great problems involved in the defense of the free world are so vast and so complex that no man could hope in a lifetime of study and reflection to solve them all. He can certainly not be sure of the accuracy of his conclusions. In my own case, to a lifetime of professional study I have recently been able to add the observations of a very hurried trip to 13 capitals, but that is most obviously a meager foundation upon which to base the conclusions that I have formed and am about to present to you.

So, aware as I am of this responsibility, I do assure you that I approach you in very deep humility and ask from you only this much on faith, that you do believe in the sincerity of my convictions. I have no end to serve, as I know you have no end to serve, except the good of the United States; and that is the reason I am talking here. And that is the reason I am back in uniform, and it is the reason I have the courage to appear before this body to express my convictions.

I am also aware of the very big responsibilities devolving upon you gentlemen. You will be forced, from time to time, and soon, to make decisions that are going to be far-reaching. In my

opinion, they may determine the course of our civilization, whether or not free government is going to continue to exist upon the earth safely and with all of the rights and privileges that devolve upon the individual citizen under that protection.

A Platform of Understanding

As I start this talk, I think it would be well to establish a platform of understanding. Let us make certain assumptions. Now, the first, I have already made, that the Members of Congress here assembled and I have one object in common view, the good of the United States.

The next assumption I would like to make is that we are concerned not only with the protection of our territories, of our rights, of our privileges, but we are also concerned with the defense of a way of life. Our own way of life has certain factors that must persist if that way of life itself is to persist, for example, the freedom of the individual, his political freedom, his freedom of worship, and that he will have an economy based upon free enterprise. In other words, our system must remain solvent, as we attempt a solution of this great problem of security. Else we have lost the battle from within that we are trying to win from without.

I do not believe, for example, that the United States can pick up the world on its economic, financial, and military shoulders and carry it. We must have cooperation if we are to work with other nations. The results of the effort to be the mutual, the common good, the common security of the free nations of the free world.

¹Made before an informal meeting of the Congress on Feb. 1 and reprinted from the *Congressional Record* of Feb. 2, p. 909.

Military defense is made up of many things. The things that defend the nation or that act for it on the field of battle are many and varied, and as complex as the nation itself. The fighting forces are but the cutting edge of a very great machine, the inspiration and the power for which are found in the hearts of the citizens. All of the various mechanisms that are necessary are represented in our industrial capacity, our economic processes, and so on, so that, when we talk about defending the free world, we are not merely talking about defense in the terms of divisions and battleships and planes. We are talking about what is in our hearts, what we understand with our heads, and what we are going to do as a body. And let me here say, gentlemen, that unless this assumption is correct I am out of place.

We are not attempting to build a force that has any aggressive, any belligerent intent; we are concerned only with one thing. In a world in which the power of military might is still too much respected, we are going to build for ourselves a secure wall of peace, of security.

This very moment I think is a good time to bring up this one thought: What we are trying to do cannot honestly be considered by any other nation as a threat to its existence, as a threat to any peaceful purpose it may have. If any such charge is made in the propaganda of the world, it is for a nefarious purpose, and any kind of attempt or announcement to move against us because of the simple modest actions we are trying to take is merely an excuse. I must say to you that that purpose would have been executed anyway if we did not do it, if that is the only reason they have for moving against us.

The NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] organization foresees and plans for the common defense of the free world with specific reference to those nations on the border of the North Atlantic. Since we are approaching this problem from the welfare of the United States, I think it well to pause just for a moment to review certain factors with you. These factors are: What is the importance of Western Europe to us? There are, of course, ties of sentiment; they are the people from whom we drew originally our genius, our blood stream; they are our relatives, and there are other bonds beyond those of sentiment that appeal to us in this job of protecting ourselves. We must look at all the common factors.

Behind our faith in them, since that is the basic assumption of the NATO organization, first of all in Western Europe there exists the greatest pool of skilled labor in the world. In Western Europe, exists a great industrial fabric that is second in its capacity only to that of our Nation. There are more than 200 million people who are related to us. If we take that whole complex with its potential for military exploitation and transfer it from our side to another side, the military balance of power has shifted so drastically that our safety would be gravely imperiled, grossly imperiled. The significance of the Western European group of nations to us is even greater than that. They have with many areas of the world close blood, political, and economic ties. It is scarcely possible to imagine the fall of Western Europe to communism without the simultaneous fall of certain of these great areas, particularly those, and first those, areas which have a political dependency upon the European powers, the very areas from which we draw the materials which are absolutely essential to our existence, our way of life. No matter how strong we prove in keeping open routes of communication, we must always keep open, clearly we must keep open the areas, keep them open to us when we need their trade in order to exist. Take such items only as manganese, copper, uranium. Could we possibly ever exist without access to them?

I believe that such things as this are tied up in our concern with the Western European complex in our determination—our decision that, as I understand it, has already been made—that we must defend them. But I refer again to the statement I have made, we cannot do this thing alone. All we would be doing would be to disperse our strength throughout the world unless we were sure first that we were being given full cooperation; and, second, that this strength of ours properly placed in other countries will there inspire the growth of still greater power and multiply every single effort that we make by comparable effort on the part of our friends.

As I said a moment ago, military strength is made up of various things of which the fighting forces are merely the cutting edge. One of the greatest factors in this whole thing is morale, and, ladies and gentlemen, almost the rest of my talk will be made up directly or indirectly in discussions of this question of morale, because morale

involves understanding, it involves heart, it involves courage, fortitude, basic purpose.

Intent and Accomplishments of European Nations

Where my trip comes in is this: What have I been able to find out about the basic intent, the basic purpose, the basic morale of Europe? It is a complex question; and, again, certainly I do not consider that there is anything sacrosanct about the conclusions I have reached. Again I can only say they are honest.

We have heard for many years, five at least, much about the destruction of the European nations, about their material destruction, but above all about their loss of spirit, their loss of will, their unreadiness to do something for themselves. Of course, I think that Americans, in general, have not really tried to blame Europeans for this failure as we have seen it. They have tried merely to explain it. After all, Europe was occupied for 4 years; its industries were destroyed and its people lived in fear of the informer next door. They were crushed; their systems of government were overturned, and they lived according to the dictates of an invader.

The effects of the Marshall Plan have been marked and have been important to the partial rehabilitation of Europe, but it would be false and idle to say that there does not exist in many strata of society pessimism bordering upon defeatism.

But there is, likewise, evidence, ladies and gentlemen, of a rejuvenation, a growth of determination, a spirit to resist, a spirit again to try to live the lives of free men, to hold their heads up in the world, to do their part and to take the risk. I am going to quote to you a few examples; because I do not ask you to accept such a statement as that at face value, I would rather give you a few examples of the things that influenced my own judgment.

On my arrival in France, I talked with the Government there and found this: That to their conscription law they have now added a proviso that permits almost no exemption for any cause whatsoever. They have made it one of the strictest, most inclusive conscription laws that would be possible to devise. As of this moment, their tour of service is 18 months, but they pointed out to me the very many factors that have limited it from being greater and indicated that one

of the most important of these was lack of instructors, capable instructors. They cannot get instructors because they are losing many of them each month in Indochina. But, as that is relieved and they get more equipment, they will go further and extend the tour to 2 years.

They are determined to stand against communism, both internally and externally, with courage in their hearts. Most of it has been inspired, at least it has been strengthened by the consummation of the NATO Treaty. There is no question about that.

I moved into Belgium and found similar determination. In Holland, I received statements of the increased military preparations that they are going to make.

Denmark, exposed as it is way out between the Baltic and North Seas, likewise, is going to do everything that represents their maximum effort.

In Norway, there is no question about the determination of their will to resist. Their attitude is that resistance to the point of destruction is preferable.

In Rome, it was quite clear that there is a stiffening resolve to meet this issue face on. While they are limited in the amount of their military force by treaty, they have determined to make that force efficient and to put it unreservedly at the command of the NATO powers.

I am not even going to mention my several conversations in Germany and for a very specific reason. I personally think that there has to be a political platform achieved and an understanding reached that will contemplate an eventual and earned equality on the part of that nation before we should start to talk about including units of Germans in any kind of an army. I, certainly, for one commander, want no unwilling contingent, no soldiers serving in the pattern of the Hessians who served in our Revolutionary War, serving in any army I command. Therefore, until the political leaders, the diplomats, and the statesmen find the proper answer, it is not for a soldier to delve in too deeply.

In little Luxembourg, I had an unusual experience. I think you would like to hear about it as illustrating the readiness of the nations, today, to try to cooperate. They are very small; there are only 300,000 people there, but they set their jaws and said: "We will have universal military service with no exemptions." They said: "We are very badly handicapped; we have equip-

ment for one battalion only. What we particularly need is more artillery equipment."

When I stopped in Ottawa, I told the Canadians about this trouble and the Canadians said: "Why, we have some artillery; we can ship it tomorrow." When I got to West Point a few hours later, I was greeted with the information that the Canadian Government had approved of the transfer and just left the red tape to me and my staff to look after.

What I am trying to say is that, out of these conferences, I sensed the feeling that there will be a rejuvenation of spirit if we can put ourselves into this thing, not only with the sense that we must do it because there is no acceptable alternative, because standing alone and isolated in a world with the rest completely dominated by communism, our system would have to wither away, our economy could not thrive.

Just stop to consider, ladies and gentlemen, that there are in the free world today—and not counting all of the outlying segments in such places as Australia, New Zealand, South America, and other parts of the free world—in Europe and the North American Continent, alone, there are 350 million people who represent the highest culture man has been able to achieve upon this earth. They are responsible for every advance of science, the arts, and culture; they possess great reservoirs of leadership that have not been touched; they possess, on the average, a higher understanding than any other people in the world; they have the greatest productive capacity. Thanks to our great wisdom in keeping the proper strength upon the sea and in the air, we have access to the raw materials that we need. Why, then, are we frightened of totalitarian government? For only one reason, because they have a unity of purpose. True, it is a unity achieved by ignorance, by force, by the NKVD.

What we have got to do, the only thing we have to do, is to meet that unity with a higher type of unity, the unity of free men that will not be divided. Someone in achieving that unity has to take the leadership, and I mean some one nation, not some one individual. We cannot either individually or at the national level afford to look over our shoulders with a suspicious thought that our friend is not doing as much as we are. We must, by example, inspire and insist and get everybody to do his maximum. The fullness of his performance will be limited by his capacity only. All of

us must make this problem that of the highest priority.

I do not say, ladies and gentlemen, that that has been achieved. I merely say that, if the presentation I have made of the military situation, the possibilities of development in the whole economic world based upon the loss or the retention of Western Europe within our own wall of security, if those presentations are only reasonably accurate, then, it is clear that we must do this. What nation is more capable, more ready for providing this leadership than the United States? We have been spared much of the discouragement, the defeatism, the destruction that has been visited upon Europe. We are younger, we are fresher, and a further important point is that we are farther removed from the immediate threat. We do not dwell in the gray zone. This strength, as I see it, must grow up in the rear and be pushed out. I do not mean pushed out in the sense that as soon as we produce units they must be deployed all over the world. I mean financial, moral, military, and material strength.

Our friends must know it. Inspired by it and living with it they must produce equal amounts of their own, far more than equal in particular areas. Our view in the central position must be directed to many sectors. We cannot concentrate all our forces in any one sector, even one as important as Western Europe. We must largely sit here with great, mobile, powerful reserves ready to support our policies, our rights, our interests wherever they may be in danger in the world.

The point I make is that Western Europe is so important to our future, our future is so definitely tied up with them, that we cannot afford to do less than our best in making sure that it does not go down the drain.

I repeat that, given the premise that we must produce, there is, then, one element left, time. We must accept, we must always accept this disadvantage militarily, internationally, that goes with peaceful intent and defensive purpose only. Any aggressor picks a day on which he intends to strike, and he builds everything to that point. We have to devise a scheme that we can support, if necessary over the next 20 years, 30 years, whatever may be the time necessary, as long as the threat, the announced threat of aggression remains in the world. That means we must be ready at any time. One of the important times is today and from hereon. As long as we are determined

to secure the peace, we have to use, employ, or resort to force and military power. In so doing, let us not forget that there is not a moment to waste.

Need for Equipment

This brings me to a very important point: One of the great deficiencies in Europe is equipment, military equipment. Not only was all of this taken away from them in the war, but their facilities, destroyed, damaged as they were, have, since that time, been all occupied in trying to restore some semblance of a decent standard of living to their millions. They have little in the way of munitions productivity although it is growing, and some of it, indeed, is very good.

I believe that the transfer of certain of our units should be in direct ratio to what Europe is doing so that we know that we are all going forward together and no one is suspicious of the other.

The great need of the moment, as I say, is equipment. The great, the crying need today, as I see it, is equipment, the impedimenta of armies, of navies, of air forces. It must be furnished quickly and properly adjusted to this purpose of ours, the purpose of peace and security, to our ability to carry it forward without insolvency for year after year. I believe that, within those limits, we must now go into the production of equipment exactly as if we were preparing for the emergency of war.

We must remember that in World War II we used a system we called lend-lease, and I heard often in my headquarters people criticize this scheme of lend-lease. I never could feel that way about it, and I will tell you why, ladies and gentlemen. It took a rifle and a man to go out and advance the cause of the Allies against the enemies we had. If the United States could provide merely the rifle and get someone else to carry it in order to do the work that was necessary, I was perfectly content.

I believe in this thinking, particularly today. If we can put munitions in the hands of people that we know will serve on the side that is essential to our future security, to the kind of life our grandchildren are going to live, the only thing we need to know is that they are going forward with us. They are not lagging in their hearts or in their efforts.

I would say that in this particular subject of

equipment the United States faces again the great proposition of transferring so much of its great productive capacity into the terrible business of producing munitions of war. You gentlemen are going to find it one of your most difficult, but at the same time one of your most important and immediate, tasks.

I believe as of now that with that equipment we will find a great rejuvenation in western morale. What we are trying to do, ladies and gentlemen, is to start a sort of reciprocal action across the Atlantic. We do one thing which inspires our friends to do something, and that gives us greater confidence in their thoroughness, their readiness for sacrifice. We do something more and we establish an upward-going spiral which meets this problem of strength and morale. The only thing that can defeat us is to establish a descending spiral born of suspicion, unreadiness on the part of each of us to do his job, the job that he knows in his own heart he must do.

I should like to bring to your attention a few things that I think are important to remember. Enemy propaganda has among other things, as it is reflected in the European press, tried to make it appear that the whole job is hopeless. He has shouted it from the housetops. If they say it is hopeless, they must have a purpose. Let us not believe too freely enemy propaganda, or the propaganda of somebody who wants to defeat our peaceful, our sane, our utterly just purposes. Let us not forget the strength of America, its great people, its history, its broad acres, its productive capacity, its great capacity for leadership. And, then, let us keep in our minds the kind of organization we shall have when we bind that up heart and soul and in material ways with our friends across the sea.

Question of Morale

I come back again for a moment to the question of morale. Nobody can defend another nation. The true defense of a nation must be found in its own soul, and you cannot import a soul. We must make sure that the heart and soul of Europe is right. That is one of the obligations, gentlemen, that is imposed on me and my staff. I cannot conceive that the United States ever consented to accept the responsibility for acting in Western Europe except with those two reservations, that their representatives would do their utmost to see

that they were all advancing together and that the United States was not being made merely an Atlas to carry the world upon its shoulders. I can see that each one of you in your great responsibilities as the lawmakers of this Nation has an element and a part of that responsibility individually. But we must not watch that so closely that we fail to get out in front to provide the leadership that will make this thing a complete success.

So this faith in America is one that lies at the bottom of this whole thing. Faith that the leadership she can provide will inspire the same kind of feeling, the same kind of effort in our friends abroad. And, there, I am sure we must exercise a bit of patience. It takes some time for our purposes—no matter how plainly we think they may be written upon the wall—it takes some time for others to understand those purposes and to gain faith in them. Remember, we have our own doubts and divisions, and we have our own debates. Think how that is multiplied in Europe, where there are 10 of these nations in this organization, and they have all of the nationalistic factors to increase the intensity of the debate. We must have patience. Some of their problems are very, very serious. France, in the war against communism in Indochina, is losing monthly more than half of the men she can produce as instructors, the instructors they need to produce the army in France which they are so desperately trying to do. They have promised, in spite of that, to have by the end of the year 1953, roughly, 25 battle-ready divisions. That is the kind of effort they are making.

Britain has similar things to face. Others, too, have problems. So while we may get a bit impatient when we think they do not see instantly what we are trying to do and what they should do in order to have the effort mutual and equal, we must have patience, ladies and gentlemen. Leadership must have patience or it cannot succeed.

Living Standards

And now there is one other point. I tried desperately to bring to you gentlemen specific types of comparisons that would convince you today of Europe's intent and of Europe's accomplishments, but when I tried to take such items as the proportion of gross national product that is turned into military purposes, when I tried to take the terms

of enlistment, or the terms of service under conscription, when I tried to take the number of men that are actually in uniform or the kind of force they were trying to produce, the amount of their national budget that is put into military purposes, I found it impossible to make such comparisons. I started to talk about it in one nation, and a man said to me, "General, we are amazed at the amount of your national product that you can devote to this great purpose. We understand that you are going to put about 20 percent of your gross national product into military or semimilitary purposes. Come with me, come out to the villages and come to the farms and see what a 5-percent reduction in our standard of living means." I looked at that squarely in the face.

I would like to bring you specific criteria, and I find myself disappointed in being unable to do so. I do come back to this, however, the defense of freedom is exactly like the appreciation for freedom, it is in the heart. It is a job that each of us here can do.

And though I cannot bring you back specific criteria by which you may judge for yourselves in the materialistic way, I do hope earnestly that each of you will take the opportunity to go to Europe and see whether you appreciate and sense this coming rejuvenation, this great determination that I think I sense. I assure you that when I get a headquarters established every one of you will be welcome there. Some of you were in my headquarters some years ago. It will be a nice return visit if you come back.

The cost of peace is going to be a sacrifice, a very great sacrifice individually and nationally. But the total war is tragedy; it is probably the suicide of civilization.

Moment of Decision

I came back, ladies and gentlemen, with the purpose of rendering just a report. It is not my proper role to be exhorting the Members. I am trying now to make my words those of education; I am trying to make them those of deep conviction that the world, our world, has arrived at a moment of decision. I have come to the conclusion that we can go on following the basic principles of our system safely and surely, subject to the tasks that I have here so briefly tried to outline. We can do it without constituting of ourselves or of our forces a threat to any other

nation. Any attempt so to describe it would be for propaganda purposes only.

I close, ladies and gentlemen, on one note only which I have not to this moment mentioned, because it does not lie completely within my province, but it is important. That is our own efforts to let the world understand what we are about, what we are, and sometimes our own efforts to have our own people understand what we are trying to do. In any event, I believe that the United States needs a very, very much stronger information service. In our case, I would not call it propaganda, because the truth is all we need. We do not have to falsify the record nor our intentions.

I think most of you know it has been my in-

variable practice when I appear before a body such as this to ask for a question period. As has been explained to you by your Presiding Officer, it was decided that it was impossible today. But I am, I believe, going to be in joint meetings with four committees of the Congress. I assure you that, so far as it lies within my power to do so, I will answer as honestly and sincerely as I know how every single question which you may choose to ask me.

This has been a very great honor, ladies and gentlemen. I cannot tell you how much it means to me that you have assembled to hear the conclusions that I have drawn and the beliefs that I hold with respect to this very, very great task.

Thank you very much.

THE CONGRESS

Legislation

Audit Report on Inter-American Affairs Corporations. Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States—transmitting a report on the audit of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs for the 2 years ended June 30, 1949, together with Brencin-Radio, Inc., and Institute of Inter-American Transportation for the periods from July 1, 1947, to the dates of final liquidation, May 10 and August 20, 1949, pursuant to the requirements of the Government Corporation Control Act (31 U. S. R. 841). H. Doc. 631, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 51 pp.

Eighth Report to Congress of the Economic Cooperation Administration. For the quarter ended March 31, 1950. H. Doc. 645, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 137 pp.

Report of National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President of the United States—transmitting a report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems covering its operations from October 1, 1949, to March 31, 1950. H. Doc. 658, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 63 pp.

Amending the Nationality Act of 1940, As Amended. Message from the President of the United States returning without approval the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 238) to amend the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended. H. Doc. 702, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 5 pp.

Internal Security Act of 1950. Message from the President of the United States returning without approval the bill (H. R. 9490) to protect the United States against certain un-American and subversive activities by requiring registration of Communist organizations, and for other purposes. H. Doc. 708, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 44 pp.

The Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, second session on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951—Department of Defense Mutual Defense Assistance Program. 552 pp.

The Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951. Additional hearings before subcommittees of the Committee

on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-first Congress, second session, on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951—Interior Department, State Department, Treasury Department. 70 pp.

Authorizing the President To Appoint Col. Henry A. Byroade as Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, Without Affecting His Military Status and Perquisites. S. Rept. 2269, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 3807] 2 pp.

Certain Basque Aliens. S. Rept. 2352, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 1192] 23 pp.

Condemning Communist, Fascist, or Nazi Film Exhibition in the United States. S. Rept. 2365, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Res. 321] 3 pp.

Exempting From Duty Articles Imported From the Virgin Islands Which Contain Duty-Free Foreign Materials. S. Rept. 2368, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. Rept. 6343] 2 pp.

Protecting the Internal Security of the United States (Minority Views). S. Rept. 2369, Part 2, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 4037] 21 pp.

Protecting the Internal Security of the United States (McCarran Report). S. Rept. 2369, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. 4037] 16 pp.

Utilization of Farm Crops: Price Spreads—Coffee. Report of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate—pursuant to S. Res. 36 and S. Res. 198 resolutions authorizing an investigation relative to expanded uses of farm crops. S. Rept. 2377, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 44 pp.

Certain Cases in Which the Attorney General Had Suspended Deportation. S. Rept. 2442, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 102] 2 pp.

Limitations Upon Authorizations for United States Participation in Five International Organizations. S. Rept. 2450, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany H. J. Res. 334] 16 pp.

Revision of the United Nations Charter. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on resolutions relative to revision of the United Nations Charter, Atlantic Union, World Federation, and similar proposals. S. Rept. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 64 pp.

Authorizing the Appointment of a Committee To Attend the General Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association To Be Held in Australia or New Zealand. S. Rept. 2502, 81st Cong., 2d sess. [To accompany S. Con. Res. 105] 1 p.

Peace May Be Won

by John Foster Dulles
Consultant to the Secretary¹

Let me say, first of all, that we have faith that we are really building for peace and not for war. Many feel that it is unrealistic to talk about peace when battle rages in nearby Korea. It is indeed ominous that the peaceful Republic of Korea should have been suddenly attacked by heavily armed forces, and that hundreds of thousands of North Korean and Chinese Communists are being driven to slaughter in order to gain a strategic position which has been coveted by Russia since the days of the czars.

Irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. That clearly exposed fact carries a grave warning to us all. But it is not a warning which calls for panic or for a fatalistic assumption that general war is bound to come.

The United States, I can assure you, is proceeding on the assumption that general war is avoidable. But, also, we assume that peace will not be gained merely by wishing for it. History has taught that, time after time, but the lesson seems never to be learned. The reality is that to win peace requires vigorous, sustained, and well-directed efforts which compare, in magnitude and sacrificial quality, with the efforts required to win a war.

The United States is now making such an effort, and, because of that, I can bring you a message of hope, not of despair.

No one can, of course, foresee surely what others may do. But it is possible to see how to gain a probability of security. It can come if the nations follow internationally the tested principles which, in a domestic community, give individuals a probability of security.

The Elemental Rules for Security

Most of us have homes within which we live and where we keep our personal belongings and valuables. The first responsibility for making them secure falls on the head of the household. He must have only trustworthy people in the home. Otherwise, the household goods will probably be stolen. There is little safety, and little sympathy, for those who run their households so carelessly that criminals have the freedom of the home.

The prudent householder also keeps his valuables behind closed doors and often under lock and key. He does not leave them lying about where they can be picked up by sneak thieves. Locked doors and cabinets are no insuperable obstacle to hold robber gangs, but they deter the lesser criminals.

¹ Address made before the American-Japan Society at Tokyo on Feb. 2 and released to the press on the same date.

That leaves to be dealt with the extreme criminal elements who are capable of breaking in and entering with violence. As against them, collective measures are the only dependable deterrent. It is not practicable to keep armed guards in every house—that would be too expensive. But communities, normally, create a central law enforcement group, which can move quickly and surely into action if there is violent robbery and probably catch and punish those who violate the law. That generally frightens off even those who have the temperament for violent robbery. The result is that, in a well-ordered community, robbers rarely indulge their evil ambitions. The likelihood of failure is a deterrent to aggression.

International Negligence

Most of the postwar international robberies that have occurred have been because nations failed to take internal precautions, such as are the personal responsibility of the householder himself. Nations have given opportunities within their own homeland to those who were the secret agents of international gangsters, and they did not put their valuables behind the national equivalent of lock and key. The result has been that, without any open armed attack, without a shot being fired, all or large parts of many nations have been robbed of their freedom and brought under the bondage of imperialist communism.

In some cases, the governments and people woke up to the danger when the agents of the foreign gang had stolen much, but not all, of the power. Then, there ensued an open fight, a civil war, to see who would control.

Bolshevik communism has, however, showed a desire to avoid the possible consequences of a breaking and entering with open violence. Even in Korea, the attackers pretended that they were engaged only in civil war and that the Chinese Communist armies came in as "volunteers." Japan, as it looks forward to restored sovereignty, can draw some useful lessons from these elemental security principles and from the consequences of ignoring them.

National Responsibility

To Prevent Indirect Aggression

The Japanese Government and people will, themselves, have the primary responsibility to take care of the risks that fall short of invasion in force, the dangers that are often referred to as those of "indirect" aggression.

Japan will have the duty to keep its homeland reasonably free of criminal agents. That requires, most of all, a healthy and vigorous Japanese society. A national household of 80 million people is too numerous to be protected merely by trying to catch all the Communist agents. There is need for vigilance but not for a police state

which, itself, creates the resentments which make alien penetration easier. It is impossible to prevent communism from penetrating into and breeding in societies where there is repression, misery, and injustice on a large scale.

The United States has been helping Japan to build a good society, and, while peace will change the form of our relations and place primary responsibility upon Japan itself, it will not end the friendly disposition of the United States.

The Japanese Government and people will also, then, have the primary responsibility to maintain in their homeland a protection corresponding to that of a householder who keeps his valuables under lock and key so that they cannot be stolen except by a breaking in with violence. Any people who avoid that precaution are guilty of contributory negligence and receive and deserve little sympathy. Five years ago, I said to my own countrymen:

If we neglect our military establishment that may lead to a dangerous misjudgment of us by the Soviet leaders. They take it for granted that those who have precious things will, if they are able, maintain a force-in-being to protect them. They assume that a man who does not put a lock on the door of his house has nothing in it that he greatly values.

Just as the prudent householder has a duty to create protections which deter all who do not have the boldness to rob with violence, so every nation which wants to preserve its liberties has its own duty to maintain a sufficient screen so that its boundaries cannot be passed by hostile armies unless they are willing to take the consequence of open violence and killing.

In the case of Japan, the problem in that respect is simplified by the fact that Japan is an island country, separated by water from the aggressive land mass of communism.

Collective Defense Against Direct Aggression

When we turn from the dangers of "indirect" aggression to those of direct aggression—that is, armed attack in force from without—a different type of protection must be found, because, while individual nations can singly cope with "indirect" aggression, few nations can cope with full scale armed attack by a powerful aggressor. As against that, the individual nation, like the individual householder, needs a collective security arrangement.

The United Nations was formed for that purpose and its first stated purpose is "to take effective collective measures for the prevention . . . of threats to the peace." The Security Council was given the duty to create an international force to deter aggression. However, this has been prevented by the Soviet Union, through use of its veto power.

At the recent session of the United Nations General Assembly, the members took note of this dangerous paralysis and, with only the five Soviet

bloc votes in opposition, recommended that each member nation should create forces which would serve as United Nations units.

We can, therefore, expect gradually the bringing into being of an adequate international force, subject to direction by the United Nations. Until then, the deterrent to international robbery by large-scale violence resides in the commitment of national power to regional and collective security arrangements such as are authorized by the United Nations Charter.

Japan Is Invited

Today, the principal deterrent power is possessed by the United States. We do not, however, intend to reserve that power only to protect ourselves. We are prepared to combine our power with that of others in mutual commitments, in accord with the United Nations Charter, so that the deterrent power which protects us will also protect others. Japan, if it is disposed to protect itself against indirect aggression, can, if it wishes, share collective protection against direct aggression.

That, however, is not a choice which the United States is going to impose upon Japan. It is an invitation. The choice must be Japan's own choice. The United States is not interested in slavish conduct. That is the stock-in-trade of the Communist world. We are concerned only with the brave and the free.

Under such a security program as we have outlined, based on cooperation with Japan and our other friends, the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States armed forces, in and about Japan, as a testimony to the unity between our countries.

Such an arrangement would create, for Japan, a situation very different from that of the Republic of Korea prior to June 1950. The United States had withdrawn its armed forces from Korea, and it had no responsibility there other than as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations had never made it clear that an attack by North Koreans on the Republic of Korea would lead to an invoking of the immense power that was available to strike at the roots of aggression. The aggressors were tempted by the probability that the reaction to their attack would be localized so as to give the aggressor every advantage and so as to subject the defenders to every disadvantage. Thus, the deterrent of powerful counterattack was wholly lacking.

If, however, there were, in Japan, the conditions I suggest, no aggressor could rely upon enjoying what General MacArthur has well called a "privileged sanctuary." Then, an aggressor would be subjected to a striking power, the immensity of which defies imagination.

The United States produces many times as much steel, oil, aluminum, and electric power as does

any other nation. We are now turning much of that into actual military power, because we are not sure that those with aggressive intent respect any other form of power. Other free people are doing the same.

All of that creates a powerful deterrent to a possible aggressor. That is not mere speculation. We already know that nations with proved aggressive intent and great military power have not used the method of open military conquest. That is not because of moral restraints, which they openly disdain, or because of the power of local resistance but because of fear of retaliatory power used in the interest of collective security.

You will have noted that the security program we outline does not require that the Japanese nation should become militaristic and create such land, sea, and naval forces as tempted Japan down the road to destruction. Against that, the new Japan has rightly set its face. The program would realize the United Nations ideal which is that the "inherent rights of individual or collective self-defense" shall be so implemented that "armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest." In that way, there can be security and peace.

Economic Welfare Attainable

What is peace?

Peace is not just the drab business of seeking security. Peace is a positive and creative state which can and should enrich the life of every individual, of every nation, and of the whole society of nations. Only that kind of peace is self-perpetuating.

In Japan, there is natural concern as to how to lift up the standards of material existence. That is a hard problem. It needs to be studied. Our own study convinces us that the industry, the aptitude, and the ingenuity of the Japanese people can assure the possibility of a rising economic standard through trade and commerce with the rest of the world. There is no reason for discouragement merely because Japan is, itself, relatively barren and densely populated.

I come from an island, Manhattan, where over 2 million people are crowded into 22 square miles. That island has no natural resources, except a harbor. Yet, it is one of the most prosperous areas of the entire world.

There is no folly greater than that of measuring people's economic potential in terms of square miles per capita. The most sparsely settled areas are usually the poorest.

Of course, new arts and new markets cannot be developed overnight. There are bound to be periods of difficulty. Also, defense programs are going to create temporary stringencies of most raw materials. There will be need for patience and persistence and for some sacrifice and perhaps for some outside help. But Japan can have a good economic future if she cultivates the good will of

potential customers and if she devotes to industrial effort even a small fraction of the energy which she devoted to building a war machine.

Realization of Spiritual Aspirations

Life, of course, is far more than mere physical living, and men are more than bodies. They have minds and spirits, and the joy of life depends largely upon nonmaterial things. Here, there is no limit to the capacity for creative development. The Japanese people have already demonstrated, over the centuries, the capacity to appreciate and to create beauty and culture. The distinctive position which the Japanese have already won in that respect holds out great promise for the future. The richness of the free world depends largely on the stimulus of diversity. The entry of Japan into the free world can greatly increase that richness for the benefit of us all. Some have much to give. All have much they can usefully receive. The Japanese people have distinctive qualities, the fruits of which we of the West would like to share.

The great difference between the free world and the Communist captive world is that the captive world stamps out all diversity and forces each individual into a strait-jacket of conformity which is ignoble and, in the long run, destructive of human welfare and progress. The free world stands for the right of men to be different and for each to develop peacefully in accordance with his own genius. That is what the other members of the free world will expect of a free Japan. It is in that way that the Japanese nation can realize its worthy ambitions.

The Cultivation of Worthy Ambition

The Japanese have always been ambitious people. That is a good thing. Nations, like individuals, have the right to be ambitious. Indeed, that is a duty, for people without ambition are a liability to society. Ambition becomes dangerous only when it employs fraud and violence. The Japanese people, for a time, fell under leadership which tried, by force, to promote Japanese ambitions at the expense of the legitimate ambitions of others. The fact that that was a wrong method, which failed, does not mean that ambition itself is wrong.

The new Japan has a great opportunity to exert an influence in Asia by what the founders of the United States called: "conduct and example." Our founders had faith that the United States could exert a great liberating influence throughout the world. That was their ambition, and it was realized although, during that period of history, the United States was a weak nation in the sense that it was economically poor and it had virtually no military establishment. Nevertheless, our nation won for itself a position of leader-

ship and influence in the world, and despotism receded under the force of our example.

There is a certain parallelism between the present opportunity of Japan in Asia and the nineteenth century opportunity of the United States in the West. Then, most of Europe and South America was under the heel of despotisms, and Russia, under Czar Alexander, had founded the so-called Holy Alliance to extend imperialism throughout the world. The Holy Alliance, after initial successes, collapsed, because it could not compete with political liberty. The high tide of despotism steadily receded, and the peoples of the European Continent and South America won freedom.

Japan's Opportunity To Achieve Greatness

That history can be repeated. Despotism, such as now overruns much of Asia, can never stand the nearby contrast of freedom so practiced by another Asiatic power as to produce the manifold richness of which free men alone are capable. The Bolshevik leaders know the powers of example, and that is why they have invented the iron curtain in the hope of cutting off the magnetic influence which freedom always exerts upon the subjects of despotism. Iron curtains can delay, but they cannot prevent, the inevitable. The world will not persist half slave so long as it is half free. The collapse of Communist despotism is a certainty, provided the free peoples exalt freedom by demonstrating what freedom means.

It is that fact which presents the Japanese people with their new and historic opportunity in Asia. It calls for the finest qualities of which men are capable. No one who knows the Japanese—as friend or foe—doubts that they can develop these qualities. There have been ample demonstrations of Japanese valor and willingness to sacrifice. Unhappily, these qualities have, too often, been used in efforts which misconstrued the nature of true greatness. Greatness is not measured by ability to impose on others what they do not want. Rather, it resides in the ability to find new ways whereby all men can better realize their aspirations. Those who do that attain a moral leadership and authority, which all will welcome.

Trust and Opportunity

These are the principles which inspire our mission. To realize them is not an easy task. It is not just a matter of finding words to write into a treaty. That would be simple. But good results are rarely achieved in such an easy way. The total dictionary of noble words has already been exhausted by treaties which, today, are merely

crumpled bits of paper, littering the cruel path which humanity has had to tread.

We do not believe any longer that treaty words are self-executing, whether they be words of promise or words of repression. A peace settlement cannot usefully attempt to dictate the future. It can, at best, create conditions which will make likely the good future that is sought.

To find those conditions is the purpose of the exploratory talks upon which we are now engaged here at Tokyo, following similar talks with the allied nations which are principally concerned. It is still too soon to prophesy the final outcome. There will probably be disappointments and what, to some, may seem injustices. It is never possible to put into effect lofty principles for the future without some compromise with the existing realities created by the past. We can, however, already say that we seek a peace which will afford Japan opportunity to protect by her own efforts the full sovereignty which peace will have restored; opportunity to share in collective security against direct aggression; opportunity to raise her standard of living by the inventiveness and industry of her people; and opportunity to achieve moral stature and respected leadership through the force of good example.

These are the opportunities which we shall seek to create through a peace which will reflect a feeling by the victors that Japan is now a nation to be trusted. There are still, in some respects, understandable reservations. But confidence has grown during the period since surrender, as the Japanese people, responding to the just policies of the Supreme Commander, have loyally fulfilled the surrender terms. It is upon that solid foundation of justice and loyalty that we plan to build our peace—a peace of trust and opportunity.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of United Nations Command, has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following United Nations document numbers: S/1963, January 2; S/1965, January 3; S/1966, January 4; S/1967, January 5; S/1970, January 8; S/1973, January 9; S/1974, January 9; S/1975, January 10; S/1977, January 12; S/1979, January 13; S/1984, January 23; S/1985, January 23; S/1986, January 24; S/1988, January 25; S/1989, January 26.

Soviet Lenin Day Speech Increases Doubts of Kremlin's Peace Campaign

[Released to the press January 31]

LETTER FROM SENATOR McMAHON TO SECRETARY ACHESON

January 26, 1951

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My attention has been drawn to the vitriolic and distorted attack upon the United States made in the speech on January 21 by P. N. Pospelov to a very important audience of Soviet leaders, including Premier Stalin, on the anniversary of Lenin's death.

This attack appears to me to go into a new high gear in its attempt to convince the Russian people that the United States is plotting their destruction.

I should appreciate receiving your reaction to this speech, including your estimate of its possible effect on the Soviet people and what we should do about it.

Respectfully yours,

BRIEN McMAHON
United States Senator

* * *

REPLY FROM SECRETARY ACHESON TO SENATOR McMAHON

January 31, 1951

MY DEAR SENATOR McMAHON: I have received your letter of January 26, 1951, asking certain questions regarding the speech delivered on January 21, 1951, the anniversary of the death of Lenin, by Mr. P. N. Pospelov before Premier Stalin and other high officials.

I shall reply to your questions in the order they are written. First, analysis here of Mr. Pospelov's remarks is that they do initiate a new and especially scurrilous propaganda line. This is a virulent effort by the Politburo's thought control mechanism to convince the Russian peoples that the United States has long been their historic arch enemy. The scope of the "hate the United States" campaign is thus being widened to distort not only the present truth concerning this nation, but also

the truth in the objective records of history proving the long friendship of the United States for the Russian people.

This Kremlin propaganda is easily refuted by Soviet records available in the USSR. For instance, the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* of 1932, in its biography of President Woodrow Wilson, does not contain one word to support the Pospelov charges that at the Versailles Peace Conference he planned the destruction of the Soviet Republic and the complete dismemberment of Russia. The fact is the very opposite. At Versailles the Germans were required to abrogate the infamous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and to respect the independence of all territory belonging to the Russian Empire.

Mr. Pospelov also does not mention a pertinent document, reproduced in Moscow in 1934 and distributed to the Soviet people in a booklet entitled *Soviet-American Relations, 1919-1933*. This is the note of August 10, 1920 (appearing as September 2, 1920 in the Soviet publication) to the Italian Ambassador from Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, in which he expressed the United States Government's opposition to any dismemberment of Russia, but condemned the Soviet rulers since they ruled by, I quote "savage oppression," and did not represent the Russian people.

The observer is left with a suspicion that the Kremlin is unwittingly projecting a mirror image of its own real attitude toward other nations.

The question remains unanswered why the Kremlin has taken this course.

One inevitable conclusion reached after reading this outpouring of dishonesty is that it aggravates the doubt so prevalent today regarding the value of the Kremlin's words about peace.

It has long been obvious that there is no logical connection between the Kremlin's words about peace and their deeds of hate. Recently, it has been obvious that Communist words about peace stand at sharp variance, for instance, to the Communist use of military force in the Far East, to

the Communist attempt to sabotage the economic recovery and unity of Europe, to the enslavement by force and treachery of the smaller nations of Eastern Europe.

With respect to the effect of Mr. Pospelov's speech in the U.S.S.R., and of its continued repetition to the Soviet population by the Soviet thought control mechanism, it is necessary first to recognize the existence of the silent but bitter mental battle going on in the U.S.S.R. The brave and hardy peoples of Russia, in their long and quiet resistance to first Czarist and then Communist repression, have only infrequently and briefly tasted freedom. The clock has now turned full cycle back to oppression and exploitation, but there continues this deep mental struggle to maintain decency, and morality, and to know the truth and right despite all the distortions and pressures of Communist thought control. Mr. Pospelov himself proves the existence of this bitter mental battle; he seeks to weaken his silent adversary by the loudness of his shouts.

There is no question but that the peoples of the Soviet Union themselves sense the untruth of Mr. Pospelov's statements. Those who have never been permitted to see conditions in the free world suspect—and those who have seen the free world know—how the Russian peoples have been exploited. Even when the United States and other democracies were disarming and reverting to the ways of peace after the recent war, the peoples of the Soviet Union were forced to continue to construct tanks and cannons instead of decent homes and comforts for all. The older generation remembers the sentiments, now erased from public Soviet records, of respect and friendship for the United States expressed by the Soviet Government while Lenin was still alive, when the Americans saved millions from famine in the Volga basin. The young have seen all around them, and used, the multitude of products of American labor and skill sent to the U.S.S.R. under Lend-Lease in the common war effort against the Nazis.

All the population of the Soviet Union can perceive the enormous conflict between the Kremlin's words about peace and the words which Mr. Pospelov obediently uttered.

However, we must not underestimate the power of the Kremlin's thought control mechanism to fabricate false information and to sow doubt and confusion as to the truth of our friendship. We must assist the millions of decent men and women in the Soviet Union to hold to our friendship despite the insidious and brutal mental pressures upon them.

What we must do is clear. We must speak very plainly, for the ears of the harassed Russian peoples, about things that we have long taken for granted. We must enunciate our friendship, our respect, our sympathy. We must make clear our firm hope that their great nation will in the

course of time become able to contribute mightily to the cause of peace and to work for progress through brotherhood, not through hate and bloodshed.

The radio Voice of America is now and has long been bringing to the Russian peoples the truth of the present and of the past. We must now give emphatic national voice of a major portion of this truth, the fact of American friendship. We must make very sure that the real sentiments of this nation toward the Russian peoples are known to them, despite the iron curtain of the Kremlin censorship.

The Department has reproduced Mr. Pospelov's speech in the form in which it was broadcast throughout the Soviet Union by Radio Moscow. I enclose a copy.

Radio Moscow has been giving heavy and continuing attention to this speech in its broadcasts to both its home and foreign audiences.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JACK E. McFALL
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:
Copy of Pospelov Speech.

TEXT OF SPEECH BY P. N. POSPELOV

Comrades, 27 years have elapsed since the death of the greatest genius of humanity, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The great Party of Lenin and Stalin owes its world-historic victories won during the past quarter of a century primarily to its faithfulness to the teaching of Lenin and to his testament.

Lenin's immortal ideas are lighting the path of the Soviet people to Communism. Lenin's immortal teaching is lighting, for all working humanity, the path of the struggle for liberation from the yoke of imperialism. It opens up the laws and perspectives of the development of human society, and it inspires great faith in the inevitable and final victory of the proletarian revolution over the wild beast—imperialism.

The Fourth Edition of Lenin's works, started in accordance with a decision of the Central Party Committee in 1940, has been completed by the 27th anniversary of Lenin's death. In Lenin's great works, the study of which is a vital necessity for the builders of Communism, we find the guiding lines which enable us to understand more fully the present political situation and to appreciate the tasks which face us.

In the Fourth Edition of Lenin's works, the most complete as compared with the preceding editions, many new materials and documents have been published, among them those containing the estimation of American imperialism by Vladimir Ilyich. These materials and documents show extensively the role of American imperialism as an active organizer and inspirer of the military intervention against young Soviet Russia during the first years of her existence.

Lenin on American Imperialism

In the light of the present international situation, when American imperialism acts as the leading force in the camp of the instigators of war, pursues a savage armaments race, has unleashed a bloody aggression against the peaceful Korean people, and prepares new military at-

tacks against the country of Socialism, the USSR, the countries of People's Democracy in Europe and the Chinese People's Republic—in this situation, Lenin's characterization of American imperialism is particularly instructive and deeply topical.

Lenin pointed out that American imperialism is constantly interfering in the affairs of other peoples by way of direct military intervention or by enslaving and strangling them by the noose of hunger. Lenin frequently stresses the aggressive, predatory role of American imperialism. Lenin's estimation of American imperialism reveals the roots of the criminal policy violating international cooperation and unleashing a . . . the object of gaining world domination, which the governing circles of the United States began to pursue immediately after the end of the Second World War.

The American imperialists interference in Russian affairs, their striving to suppress the Russian Revolution so as fully to enslave Russia and to loot unrestrainedly her natural resources, started even before October 1917. After the February Revolution, American imperialists supported in every way the counterrevolutionary coalition of Kerensky and Milyukov by supplying it with billions (of dollars) with which to stifle the Russian Revolution and to enslave Russia, which the American imperialists had already begun to consider as their colony.

American Intrigue Recalled

It is appropriate here to recall that the U.S. Ambassador in Russia, Francis, in November of 1917, asked the U.S. Secretary of State: "What is your opinion about treating Russia in the same way as China?"

The question referred, of course, to old semicolonial China, enmeshed with unequal, oppressive pacts which had been inflicted upon it by imperialist states. Now, after the historic victories of the great Chinese people, even the blockheaded American diplomatists would hardly dare to talk about China in such a manner. Now, as the saying goes, their hands are too short!

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, guided and inspired by the Lenin-Stalin Party, has saved the independence and freedom of our Motherland; it has saved it from the insolent encroachments of the American imperialists.

It is, therefore, not surprising that the victory of the October Revolution was greeted with rabid hatred in the camp of the American multimillionaires, who, from the very beginning of the October Revolution, became the sworn enemies of Soviet Russia. In the very first decree of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the decree on peace, the Soviet regime openly proposed a just peace, a peace with the full observance of the equality of rights of all nations; it proposed this peace to all belligerent countries, indicating to the people the way to end the imperialist war shambles.

The American, British, and French imperialists, interested in the continuation of the bloody slaughter, rejected the proposal of the young Soviet Republic. "It was precisely the Anglo-French, and American bourgeoisie," wrote Lenin, "who did not accept our proposal. It was they precisely who refused even to talk with us about a universal peace; it was they precisely who acted treasonably toward the interests of all peoples. It was they precisely who prolonged the imperialist war." Lenin wrote this in his famous letter to American workers in August 1918.

American Hatred Aroused

The decree on peace, the mighty call of the regime of revolutionary workers and peasants for a just peace, aroused the particular hatred of the American imperialists to whom the end of the war was unprofitable, since they were making wild profits out of war orders. The ruling circles of the United States, as far back as 1917,

were the initiators of the food blockade of Russia; and at the time it was reported with cynical frankness in the American press that the U.S. Government had prohibited the dispatch of food to Russia while the Bolsheviks remained in power and continued to pursue their program of concluding peace.

Even as early as the beginning of 1918 American imperialists were planning to dismember Russia and with that aim were preparing direct military intervention against our Motherland. Hoping for easy booty, some ignorant and impudent American Senators were already cheering themselves up with assertions that Russia had become nothing more than a geographical . . . and that, therefore, one could plunder her with impunity.

A certain stupid American Senator, Poindexter, supporting . . . German imperialism, quoted with sympathy their ravings about Russia being nothing more than a geographical (nation), saying that she would never become anything else; that her cohesive force, organization, and revival were gone forever; the Nation did not exist any more—*Congressional Record*, Volume 56, 1918, page 11 thousand 179.

Speaking of the interference of the United States in the affairs of the peoples of Central and Southeastern European afterwards, Poindexter said with unprecedented impudence: "Much more important is the question of what one should do with Russia, with her population of 170 million, and her unlimited food, fuel, and metal resources."

Senator Demands Intervention

Another equally "far-seeing" American Senator, Sherman, at the meeting of the Senate on June 20, 1918, demanded that the American Government should speed up and increase military intervention against Soviet Russia. He particularly drew the attention of the Government to the fact that Siberia was a very choice bit.

"Now," Sherman used to say, "this is a wheat field and a pasture for cattle and it has the same value as its mineral riches." However, the U.S. beasts of prey looked greedily not only at Siberia but also the Caucasus and its natural riches attracted their greedy eyes.

Wilson, the President of the United States, whom Lenin, in his letter to the U.S. workers, called the head of the U. S. multimillionaires and a minion of the sharks of capitalism, was one of the main inspirers of the armed intervention of the international imperialism against the young Soviet Republic and of the intervention which was committed under the guise of the hypocritical and lying phrases about the alleged noninterference in Russian affairs.

The U.S. imperialists strove in 1918 to 1920 to destroy the Soviet State. Soon after the Great October Socialist Revolution, the U.S. diplomatists began to organize counterrevolutionary plots against the Soviet Power. U.S. soldiers were sent to the territory of Soviet Russia with the aim of a direct intervention. The U.S. imperialists and the troops which were sent by them, under the deceptive flag of overseas democracy, supported the worst (enemies) of the Russian people, the archcounter-revolutionaries and monarchists, Khlchak, Miller Denikin, and the rest of the White Guards.

Apologists of Imperialism

Moscow, TASS, in Russian at Dictation Speed to the Provincial Press, Jan. 21, 1951.

(The above transmission of Pospelov's speech was interrupted with the dictation of the following addition)
(Text)

Some apologists of American imperialism are trying to falsify the historical facts concerning the American intervention in Siberia, but this is a hopeless task. The shameful part played by the American troops in Siberia is sufficiently clearly demonstrated in the memoirs of the

Commander of the American Expeditionary Corps in Siberia, Maj. Gen. William Graves.

Graves writes that nothing can refute the fact that the United States was an active partner in the intervention planned against the Russian people and in the interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people. "The United States," writes Graves, "was, I think, the last of the powers to lose faith in Kolchak," who, on Graves' admission, carried out a regime of most brutal terror.

"I doubt," writes Graves, concluding his memoirs, "that any unprejudiced person could assert that the United States did not interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. By this interference and with its Armed Forces, the United States helped to support a monarchistically-inclined and unpopular Government which was not approved of by the overwhelming majority of the population. In addition, the United States incurred the hatred of 90 percent of the Siberian population." William Graves "Kolchak, America, and Japan," Moscow, 1932, pages 11, 38 and 47." (End addition—Ed.)

Foul Role in Siberia

A shameful and foul role was played by the troops of the U. S. interventionists in the north, where together with the White Guards, they bestially killed and tortured many tens of thousands of Russian people under the pretext of a struggle against Bolshevism and robbed and carried away an enormous amount of most valuable raw materials. It suffices to say, . . . order to . . . behavior of the U. S. "democrats," that the whole territory of the Northern Region, which was occupied by the U. S.-British invaders was covered with a dense network of prisons and concentration camps.

Many tens of thousands of Russian people were thrown behind iron bars by the American-British interventionists and their lackeys—the White Guardists. The hands of American imperialists are (covered with the) Russian people's blood. The Soviet people will never forget the bloody crimes and hangman-like feats of American interventionists on our soil. During the years of foreign intervention and civil war the Soviet people . . . and heroically repelled the criminal and plundering invasion of the American, British, and other interventionists and their mercenaries—the White Guardists.

Foreign Intervention

Moscow, TASS, in Russian at Dictation Speed to the Provincial Press, January 21, 1951.

(The transmission of Pospelov's speech was interrupted with the dictation of the following addition.)

(During the whole period of foreign intervention and civil war there was not a single candidate from among the "counter revolutionary" rulers of Russia to whom the American imperialists did not give help. Kolchak, Denikin, Miller, and Yudenich, the Black Baron of Wrangel, and other great enemies of the workers of Soviet Russia, all of them were "kept" by the United States, receiving arms, war equipment, and uniforms from it in plenty.)

In his answer to the questions of an American journalist in July 1919, Lenin assessed the criminal invasion of American interventionists of our country, as well as the heroic resistance put up by the Russian people. "With regard to the United States and Japan," Lenin wrote, "we are pursuing above all the political aim of repulsing their insolent criminal and plundering invasion of Russia which serves for the enrichment of their capitalists.

"To both these states we have often and solemnly proposed peace, but they did not even answer us and continued the war, aiding Denikin and Kolchak, plundering Murmansk and Archangel, and destroying and devastating Eastern Siberia in particular where Russian peasants were offering a heroic resistance against the gangster capitalists of Japan and the United States.

February 12, 1951

"Our future political, and economic aims," Lenin said, "in relation to all the peoples, including the United States and Japan, are one and the same brotherly union with the workers and the toilers of all the countries without exception." For the characterization of the robbing plans and the intentions of American imperialism, it is necessary to point out that a so-called peacemaker and democrat, President Wilson, arrived at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919 with a program of destruction of the Soviet Republic and complete dismemberment of Russia. It was, moreover, envisaged that a mandate was to be given for U. S. administration of the areas of the Caucasus to be separated from Russia.

Wilson the Imperialist

Lenin showed in several of his speeches that the idealized democratic republic of Wilson proved in reality to be a form of the most mad imperialism, the most shameful oppression, and the strangling of the weak and small peoples. Lenin branded American imperialism as the executioner and strangler of Russian freedom, as the gendarme of Western Europe.

"It became apparent," Lenin said, "that the British and the Americans act as executioners and gendarmes of Russian freedom, as this role was carried out under the Russian executioner, Nicholas I, no better than the kings who played the part of executioners when they strangled the Hungarian revolution. Now this role has been taken over by Wilson's agents.

"They are strangling the revolution in Austria; they are playing the role of gendarme; and they are presenting an ultimatum to Switzerland—"We will not give you bread unless you enter into the struggle against the Bolshevik Government." They tell Holland—"You must not allow Soviet Ambassadors into your country, or else there will be a blockade." Their weapon is simple—a rope of hunger, and it is with this that they are strangling the people."

Lenin showed that the American imperialism, which was hiding behind a mask of "democracy," is no better than the bestial German imperialism and it moves toward the same shameful end as German imperialism.

"We see," said Lenin in November 1918 at the Sixth All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Councils, "how Great Britain and America, countries which had more responsibility than others of the remaining democratic republics, ran wild in the same mad way as Germany at another time, and it is for this reason that they will just as soon, if not sooner, reach the same end that German imperialism so successfully attained. To begin with, it swelled to enormous proportions over three quarters of Europe, grew fat, and then exploded, leaving a revolting stench. And now British and American imperialism is heading irresistibly toward this end."

U.S.-U.K. Death Warrant

Lenin pointed out that German imperialism in 1918 signed its own death warrant when it tried to stifle the revolutionary workers and peasants of Russia and the Ukraine. The well-disciplined German Army disintegrated. The British and American imperialists will sign their own death warrant still more effectively when they undertake a venture which will bring them political disaster, when they doom their own troops to play the part of stiflers and gendarmes of all Europe.

What a stern warning are these words of Lenin to the unbridled political madmen of the American ruling circles, who, in their thirst for world domination, are thrusting the American people into the abyss of a new third World War at a giddy speed.

Today, when U.S. imperialism, having understood nothing and learned nothing from the lessons of history, is literally following in the footsteps of Hitlerite imperialists, the prophetic words of Lenin sound with par-

ticularly shattering force. Lenin taught that Anglo-U.S. imperialism was the same . . . as German imperialism. Exposing the plans and actions of Anglo-U.S. imperialists, in particular as regards the oppression and subjugation of the peoples of Russia and Western Europe, Lenin said, "They are about to oppress a people who have embarked on freedom from capitalism, to throttle the revolution. And we say with absolute certainty that now this exposed monster will also tumble into the abyss as did the monster of German imperialism."

Failure of all attempts by armed foreign intervention against Soviet Russia meant the supreme victory of the workers over international imperialism. This great victory of the young Soviet Republic over a host of innumerable enemies proved the historical laws of the Great October Socialist Revolution which opened a new era in the history of mankind.

Speaking of the tremendous significance of the routing of the armed intervention of international imperialism, Lenin prophesied in October 1920 that this fact constituted a major lesson which showed countries engaged in an aggressive policy that our cause stood firm; that whatever the attempts to invade Russia and military undertakings against Russia—and there will probably be not just one attempt—we are already steeled by our experience and on the basis of our experience know that all these attempts will be shattered; and that after every attempt of our enemies we will emerge stronger than we were before.

History has confirmed Lenin's great foresight. When, in 1941, Hitler's imperialism, fostered and reared by the American monopolies, treacherously attacked the Soviet Union, the land of Socialism under the wise leadership of the great leader and commander, Comrade Stalin, routed Hitlerite Germany and emerged from the unprecedentedly stern struggle stronger than she was before 1941. (Prolonged applause.)

Taft Recognizes Russia's Might

Today even our worst enemies are forced to recognize this incontrovertible historical fact. Even such an experienced reactionary as the American Senator Taft was recently forced to admit that the plans which are being hatched by the American aggressors for a war with Russia on the European Continent by land forces are doomed to failure and that an invasion of such a kind would prove to be impossible as Napoleon and Hitler discovered.

After the routing of the foreign military intervention, Lenin taught us that the first commandment of our policy is to be on guard, to remember that we are surrounded by men, classes, and governments that openly express the greatest hatred for us. "It must be remembered that we are always a hair's breadth away from any invasion. We will do everything within our power to prevent such a calamity," said Lenin.

Analyzing the international situation after the First World War, Lenin pointed out that as a result of that war the American imperialists gained colossal profits, that they looted fabulous wealth, and that they became more impudent than ever. More impudently than ever they began to interfere in the affairs of other people.

"The American multimillionaires," wrote Lenin in his letter to the American workers, "are possibly the richest of all and live in the least dangerous geographical situation. They profited more than anyone else. They made everyone, even the richest countries, pay them tribute. They looted hundreds of billions of dollars."

Traces of Dirt on Dollars

Moscow, TASS, in Russian at Dictation Speed to the Provincial Press, January 21, 1951.

(The transmission of Pospelov's speech was interrupted with the dictation of the following:)

(On each dollar there are traces of dirt, of dirty, secret agreements between Britain and her "Allies," between Germany and her vassals, of agreements about the sharing out of the plunder, of agreements about "aiding" one another in suppressing the workers and persecuting Socialist internationalists. On each dollar there is a clot of dirt, and so forth.)

On each dollar there is a clot of dirt from the profitable military deliveries which enriched the rich in every country and impoverished the poor. On each dollar there is the trace of blood from the sea of blood shed by 10 million killed and 20 million maimed. Lenin pointed out that as far back as in 1918 Anglo-American imperialism strove to gain world domination.

"Anglo-American imperialism has grown more insolent than ever and looks upon itself as an overlord whom nobody may resist," said Lenin. On a number of examples Lenin proved that nowhere does capital reign so insolently, cynically, and ruthlessly as in the United States, in spite of all the false words about democracy and the equality of all citizens. Lenin frequently exposed the monstrous, bestial customs cultivated by the American imperialist ringleaders even then, in the years 1917 to 20 and the cruelty with which they persecuted the revolutionary workers and simple partisans of peace.

Wilson Permitted Mob Rule

"Wilson is the President of the most democratic Republic (TASS version mentioned above inserts 'in the world' after 'Republic'—Ed.) and what does he say? In that country a mob of chauvinists shoots people in the streets for (uttering) one word calling for peace. A priest, who had never been a revolutionary, was dragged out into the street and beaten until he bled only because he preached peace," said Lenin in his speech at the Prenya District Workers' Conference in 1918.

The peace partisan, the priest (Pigelow) whom Lenin mentions, was whipped by 20 people in masks and black cloaks. "They beat him," as an eyewitness, The New York Times correspondent, described, "deliberately and rhythmically. (Pigelow) was writhing in agony, and in the end fell. They went on beating him. They beat him while he was prone. Altogether he was struck some 2,000 times. His blood mingled with the tar with which the unfortunate man had been smeared, and when he was being dragged home along the pavements, nobody knew whether it was a corpse or a living man."

(Pigelow), the unfortunate victim of lynch law, went to Washington to the President himself to complain, but the result was quite unexpected. Within a fortnight (Pigelow) himself was brought to trial on a charge of lack of patriotism and open sympathy with pacifists (and) peace partisans. Within a week after the shameful incident of (Pigelow) 17 members of the Union of Industrial Workers of the World were similarly beaten up in a beastly way and three of them died the next day. Such are the customs of American imperialism. Such is the American way of life.

Naked American Imperialism

Describing the bestial and revolting aspect and the insolence of American imperialism, Lenin said: "Before us stands an absolutely naked imperialist who does not consider it even necessary to clothe himself in anything, for he thinks himself superb even as he is!" Lenin pointed out that American imperialism's robber policy was already then in the twenties provoking a growing hatred of the peoples toward American imperialism. "America is strong. Everyone is in debt to her. Everything depends on her. She is hated more and more. She robs everyone. All bourgeois literature bears witness to the growth of hatred toward America," said Lenin at a meeting of board of the Moscow organization of the Russian Communist Party in December 1920.

In his utterances on matters of foreign policy Lenin always emphasized Soviet Russia's unswerving striving toward peace. Of exceptionally important significance is Vladimir Ilyich's answer in February of 1920 to questions of a correspondent of the American paper *New York Evening Journal* which is being published for the first time in the fourth edition of Lenin's works. Replying to the correspondent's questions as to what was the basis of peace with America, Lenin said: "Let the American capitalists leave us alone. We will not touch them. We are even ready to pay them with gold for machinery, implements, and so forth, useful for transport and production, and not only with gold, but even with raw materials."

To the question on obstacles to such a peace, Vladimir Ilyich replied: "None from our side. Imperialism is on the part of America just as on the part of all other capitalists." The predatory, robber nature of American imperialism, its strivings toward world domination, and the enslavement of Asia and Europe—about which Lenin spoke on many occasions—all these traits of American imperialism have manifested themselves particularly forcibly after the Second World War.

Unprecedented Korean Crimes

The American-British imperialists, in their strivings toward world domination, are deploying a bloody, colonial war against the peoples of the East. American troops are committing unprecedented crimes on the soil of the peace-loving and freedom-loving Korean people, who, with outstanding steadfastness and courage are struggling against the American aggressors and, together with Chinese Volunteers, are inflicting upon these aggressors devastating blows.

When they began their criminal armed intervention in Korea, the American imperialists were expecting that by mass bombing and monstrous brutality, they could intimidate and force the heroic Korean people down on their knees. But things have turned out quite differently. The troops of the American interventionists, in spite of their colossal superiority in equipment, in spite of the mobilization of enormous naval and air fleets have suffered an unprecedented military defeat in Korea. Many of those who, until quite recently, still considered American imperialism and its Army to be mighty and even invincible, are now having second thoughts.

U.S. Prestige Falls

The military prestige of the United States in the eyes of many people in Europe and Asia has now been greatly weakened. On the other hand, the cannibalistic policy, borrowed from Hitler, of turning the flourishing towns and villages of Korea into a desert zone as pursued by the American plunderers, has aroused burning hatred toward American imperialism among the people of Europe and especially the peoples of Asia.

In the same way as the American intervention in Russia suffered defeat in its time, so it will suffer defeat in Korea. There is no doubt that all crazy plans of the American imperialists for world domination will end in complete failure. The forces of war and imperialist reaction are opposed by the mighty and ever growing forces of peace, democracy, and Socialism, at the head of which is the great Soviet Union—the unshakable bulwark of peace and friendship of the peoples.

Lenin teaches that in accordance with the laws of history confirmed by the living historic experience, our great cause, the cause of liberating working people from capitalist slavery, is invincible. The immortal works of V. I. Lenin inspire us with a profound faith in the invincibility of the Communist cause. No matter what beastly action the imperialist bourgeoisie may perpetrate, to what cruel persecutions it may subject the leading and politically conscious fighters of the working class, the Communists, and even ordinary Peace Partisans, the future belongs to the

advanced ideas of our century, the ideas which no world policemen—a role to which, as is known, the United States aspires at present—shall succeed in putting behind prison bars. (Applause.)

The great Lenin-Stalin ideology of equal rights and friendship among peoples and of a struggle for a stable peace throughout the world is gaining and will continue to gain new and great victories. (Loud applause.)

Bourgeoisie Condemned to Death

In his famous work "Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," Lenin wrote: "Let the bourgeoisie rage and rave, let it outdo itself in stupid things, punish the Bolsheviks in advance, and try to kill off hundreds, thousands, and hundreds of thousands of yesterday's or tomorrow's Bolsheviks in India, Hungary, Germany, and so forth. While acting so, the bourgeoisie acts like all the classes condemned to death by history. The Communists must know that in any case the future belongs to them. Therefore, we can and must combine the greatest passion in our great revolutionary struggle with the coolest and most sober evaluation of the wild ravings of the bourgeoisie."

Comrades, we are commemorating the 27th anniversary of the death of Lenin at a time when the first half of the century has just ended. The past half century has brought the greatest triumph of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Under the banner of these ideas the Soviet people, led by the genius of Comrade Stalin, the continuator of the cause of Lenin, has built Socialism and is successfully building the Communist society. Under the banner of the ideas of Leninism, there was taking place the development of the world worker movement and the national movement of liberation and the struggle for peace, democracy, and Socialism.

Long live the wise Party of Lenin-Stalin which is leading us toward Communism! Long live peace in the whole world! Long live Leninism—the all-victorious banner of the liberation of mankind! (Prolonged applause.) (End of Pospelov's speech.—Ed.)

Travel Restrictions on Hungarian Legation Personnel in Washington

[Released to the press January 29]

The Department of State has delivered today a note to the Hungarian Minister in Washington informing him of restrictions which have been placed in immediate effect by the Department on travel by Hungarian Legation personnel in the United States.

This action of the Department has been taken as a reciprocal measure in view of a notification addressed to the American Legation in Budapest on January 19 by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs announcing the imposition of travel restrictions on American Legation personnel in Hungary. The Hungarian order, which took effect on January 22, prohibits American Legation personnel from staying or traveling without permission from the Hungarian Foreign Office beyond an area bounded by a perimeter fixed at 30 kilometers from the approximate center of Budapest. Within this zone, entry to Csepel Island is also denied to American Legation personnel except by permit.

The text of the Department's note dated January 29 to the Hungarian Legation in this matter follows:

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic and has the honor to inform him as follows:

Effective immediately, members of the Hungarian diplomatic mission in the United States and Hungarian employees of that mission, as well as the dependents of these persons, are prohibited from staying or traveling beyond a specified area except by express permission. The perimeter of the designated area is fixed at a distance of eighteen miles from the White House, Washington, D. C.

Permission to stay or travel outside the specified area shall be requested in advance through the Chief of Protocol, Department of State, according to a prescribed form, of which a facsimile is enclosed and copies may be obtained from the Department upon request. Travel beyond the designated area should not be undertaken prior to the receipt by applicants of signed authorization from the Department of State.

The Secretary of State further informs the Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic that the Department of State will take into account in its application of the foregoing restrictions, with particular reference to the issuance of travel permits, the consideration accorded to members of the American Legation in Budapest who may wish to travel beyond the limits of the restrictive zone established by the Hungarian Government on January 22, 1951.

Enclosure:

Facsimile of "Request for Authorization to Travel." [Not printed.]

Indochinese Resistance to Communist Domination

*Statement by Donald R. Heath
Minister to the Associated States of
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia*¹

French and Indochinese troops, helped by American arms aid, are holding the pass against the spread of communism to Southeast Asia. American arms aid is not, as the Communist propaganda pretends, being used to bolster up a French colonial regime in Indochina. The French colonial regime ended with the signature of the so-called Pau accords on December 16. On January

1, all Indochinese Government services were turned over to the Indochinese states. A relatively large number of French Government technical experts are being held temporarily, at the request of the Indochinese, in certain posts until Indochinese can be trained to take their places. In the case of many positions that will be a matter of only a few months. Meanwhile, French instructors and American arms are being devoted to building up a Vietnamese national army. It will take a good many months, however, to make Vietnamese troops equal in numbers and training to the rebel troops, who are trained and equipped by the Chinese Communists. The Vietnamese have asked for the continued assistance of the French forces until the Vietnamese army is ready to assume responsibility for the security of Indochina.

I have been asked many times in the past week about the nature of the Communist threat to Indochina and its significance to the free world. The menace is as old as the creed of Bolshevism and the Communist operation in Indochina with minor variations is the same experienced by other areas under Communist attack throughout the world. The Communists seek to gain control by disguising themselves as nationalists. They attempt to prevent the development of an independent nationalist government. They go to all imaginable extremes to prevent reconstruction of the country, new development, and the alleviation of human suffering in areas not under their domination. Their tactics are those of murder, kidnap, arson, threats, and intimidation. The Communists know that the development of healthy, independent states and the development of the human and natural resources of Indochina would make their subversion and domination impossible.

The hope which I saw for the future of Indochina lies in those brave people, of whom there are many, who dare to work for security, freedom, and human betterment despite the threats of retaliation from the Communist-directed murderers and arsonists who stalk in every area. But despite attempts at intimidation, leaders from the village level to the highest positions in government are coming forward to take those risks and work to give meaning to their newly won independence.

The Chinese Communists have thrust into Korea and Tibet. There is sabre rattling on Indochina's borders. The free nations of the world are banding together. The people of Southeast Asia do not want the domination of Communist imperialism; they do not want to become the rice bowl to fuel the march of a Communist-directed Chinese war machine throughout the rest of Asia. By collective action, the free world can be maintained and new hope given to captive nations now in the Communist orbit.

¹ Made over the NBC television network on Feb. 4 and released to the press on the same date.

Why We Stay in Korea

*Remarks by Dean Rusk
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

Today I wish to say a word to those who ask why we stay in Korea. It is a serious question—because men's lives are at stake—and it deserves a serious answer.

We are in Korea because we are trying to prevent a world war and the frightful destruction of life which such a war would produce.

The thousands who have died in Korea have sacrificed their lives in a struggle to prevent the millions of deaths which world war would surely bring.

The issue in Korea is aggression. We can face it, or we can run away from it. If we face it, we have a chance to organize the determination of the world against aggression, to show the aggressor that his crime will not be accepted and that his crime will not pay. If we succeed, the aggressor may hold his hand. If we run away from it, the aggressor will learn that there is great profit in crime, that he will not be resisted, and that his victims are weak and can be destroyed at will.

These are not theories but hard facts. We Americans have already had one unforgettable lesson about what happens when unbridled ambition goes unchecked. We have seen the world go down the trail from Manchuria to Ethiopia to Munich to Poland and, finally, to Pearl Harbor. We must not tread this path again.

Let us not be discouraged too soon. At the end of World War II, the human race almost succeeded in doing what men have dreamed about for centuries, i.e., in organizing a world to keep the peace. Only one government stands in the way. That government is a dictatorship which has behind it considerable power. But the peace-loving world itself is strong, and we cannot afford to give up our goal just when we have come so close.

We are in Korea because we cannot afford to leave Red China and its neighbors under the impression that the forces of Peiping are irresistible and that Red China's neighbors must now come to terms with communism at the cost of their freedom.

The vaunted power of Red China is being unmasked in Korea. Chinese soldiers do not relish the punishment they are getting from our guns and planes and ships. They are learning that their masters have tricked them into a war of foreign aggression. They are learning that their masters have put them into battle without provision for minimum care in case of wounds or sickness or frostbite. In other words, Red China is learning a great deal about the cost of aggression.

¹ Made over NBC television Jan. 29 and released to the press on the same date.

We are in Korea because we cannot abandon 20 million gallant Koreans to communism. We and they have fought side by side against aggression for several months, sometimes in defeat and sometimes in victory. We cannot now abandon our comrades to the fate which would be theirs if the Communists took over.

Further, we cannot leave our friends in the Philippines and in Japan under the impression that we do not take our commitments seriously and that we might lack courage in the face of adversity.

Our gallant force in Korea is fully able to take care of itself. We should not act like a defeated nation when in fact we have not been defeated.

The willingness and ability of the entire free world to increase its strength and to join its forces to insure their mutual defense depends to a considerable extent upon the attitude of the United States. Our strength is increasing rapidly as is that of our friends.

If we can show that we have both the will and the ability to defend ourselves, the main attack may be averted. Our attitude in this situation may easily determine the course of history for years to come. That course may lead to peace, or it may lead to disaster. This great Nation can not let history say of us that we chose the road to disaster because we were unwilling to fight for peace.

Use of Chinese Nationalist Troops in Korea

[Released to the press February 1]

The following is the text of a letter from Assistant Secretary Jack K. McFall to Representative Horace Seely-Brown dated January 16, 1951.

MY DEAR MR. SEELY-BROWN: Reference is made to your telegram to the President dated January 1, 1951. The White House has referred your question regarding the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea to the Department for reply.

The question of the participation of Chinese Nationalist forces in the Korean hostilities or in a mainland offensive is both military (involving general strategy) and political (involving importantly the attitude of other members of the U.N.). In responding to such questions the Department must of course bear in mind the danger of making public information of great potential value to the Communists, regarding steps which will or will not be taken to meet the course of aggression upon which they are embarked. I am sure you will understand, therefore, why it is inadvisable at this stage to publicize the Government's views on these complex subjects. However, there are certain factors which I believe may be interesting and useful to you as background in

considering what role the Chinese Nationalist forces might play in the present conflict in the Far East:

First, it should be kept in mind that although training has been proceeding in a creditable manner Chinese Nationalist military capabilities remain necessarily limited, particularly when contrasted with the huge reserve of effective manpower available to the Chinese Communists. It seems safe to estimate that Nationalist ground forces are outnumbered by Chinese Communist troops by at least 8 to 1. Although large Chinese Communist forces have been shifted to Korea for the present campaign of aggression, formidable forces are still ranged along the coast of China and at various interior points with easy access to the coast. These facts are relevant in considering whether a Nationalist landing on the mainland would substantially relieve the pressure on United Nations forces by diverting Communist troops from Korea.

Second, it may be assumed that any substantial increase in equipment required to prepare Nationalist forces for action in Korea or on the mainland must come from the United States. Our own ability to furnish large quantities of the principal items of military equipment is limited by available supply and by urgent demands from many quarters. For example, if we could equip additional Nationalist divisions at this point, would it not be preferable to use this equipment to arm more Koreans to participate in the fighting for their own homes and country?

Third, the principal mission of the forces on Formosa must be the defense of the Island itself. The importance of this defensive mission will increase in the weeks to come as weather conditions become more favorable for possible Communist amphibious operations in the Formosa Strait. Would it be desirable to weaken the defense of Formosa by drawing upon those Nationalist units which can be considered effective? Units which are not effective would be of little use to the United Nations in its campaign in Korea or in an invasion of the Communist mainland. It must also be remembered that the supply of Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa is not freely renewable as is the case on the mainland, and that troops lost in operations elsewhere would tend to diminish the total supply of forces available to the National Government on the Island.

Fourth, we must not lose sight of the fact that operations in Korea are United Nations operations and that the views of the many other countries participating in the operation are factors to be taken into account.

The Department appreciates your interest in this complex and important problem. I hope the foregoing discussion of certain of its aspects will prove helpful to you.

Point 4 Administrator To Visit Other American Republics

[Released to the press January 30]

Dr. Henry Garland Bennett, administrator of the Point 4 Program of technical cooperation, will visit 11 Latin American countries. Stops will be made in Panama, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, Venezuela, and Haiti.

The Technical Cooperation administrator is making the trip to meet United States chiefs of mission and members of their staffs engaged in negotiating and conducting technical cooperation projects, to familiarize himself with operation of a number of such projects, and to confer informally with officials and leading citizens of the countries visited.

The Point 4 Program, which began operations in September 1950, now has approximately 92 technical cooperation projects in 29 countries. Most of these are in the other American Republics where the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and other United States agencies have been conducting cooperative work, principally in agriculture, health and sanitation, and education, for about 10 years.

Dr. Bennett said:

I look forward with keen interest to the opportunity to see for myself the results of the pioneer work done in applying the Point 4 principle in Latin America. I have heard some wonderful reports of the achievements of North American and Latin American technicians working together to build a better neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere.

On the basis of these accomplishments, we are expanding this cooperative effort in the Americas and applying the lessons learned here to the same kinds of joint undertakings in other parts of the free world where people are eager to increase their productivity and improve their living conditions.

I am sure that I can learn much on my trip to a number of our sister American Republics. I am sorry there isn't time to visit all of them.

Dr. Bennett's stop at Santiago will coincide with the opening on February 20 of the twelfth session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which provides policy guidance for the technical assistance program of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

Dr. Bennett will be accompanied on his trip by Mrs. Bennett and two members of his staff—A. Cyril Crilley, a special assistant, and Benjamin H. Hardy, public affairs officer.

The itinerary, with date of arrival and departure, follows: Panama, Feb. 3-3; San José, Feb. 3-5; Panamá, Feb. 5-7; Quito, Feb. 7-8; Lima, Feb. 8-12; La Paz, Feb. 12-17; Lima, Feb. 17-18; Santiago, Feb. 18-20; Buenos Aires, Feb. 20-22; Asunción, Feb. 22-25; São Paulo, Feb. 25-26; Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 26-Mar. 1; Fortaleza, Mar. 1-3; Belém, Mar. 3-5; Caracas, Mar. 5-6; Port-au-Prince, Mar. 6-8; Miami-Washington, Mar. 8.

U.S. Opposes Chinese Communist Representation in Trusteeship Council

*Statement by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre,
U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council*¹

We are again confronted with a Soviet proposal to seat a representative of the Chinese Communist regime in this Council. Since we last dealt with this question at the third special session, the General Assembly has taken several actions which have a bearing on this particular problem. On September 19th, the General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a special committee of seven members to consider the question of Chinese representation and to report with recommendations to the fifth session of the General Assembly after the Assembly completed consideration of an agenda item regarding recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a member state. This resolution also provided that, pending a decision by the General Assembly on the report of the special committee, representatives of the Chinese National Government should be seated with the same rights as other representatives.

In considering its agenda item on recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a member state, the Assembly, on December 14, 1950, adopted a resolution which provided that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the Government entitled to represent a member state in the United Nations, the question should be considered by the General Assembly, or by the Interim Committee if the Assembly is not in session, in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case. The resolution also recommended that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or the Interim Committee on the question of representation should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies.

The controversy as to which of the two claimants should represent the Government of China in the United Nations is still before the fifth session

of the General Assembly. Pending a decision by the Assembly, it would seem unwise to my Government for other United Nations organs, or bodies of the specialized agencies, to take any decision on the question of Chinese representation.

As regards the substance of the question before us, I should like to take this opportunity to again state that, in the view of the United States, representatives of the Chinese Communist regime should not be seated in any United Nations or specialized agency body while that regime is engaged in hostilities in Korea against the United Nations. This factor will undoubtedly be taken into account by the General Assembly when it considers, in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter, the question of Chinese representation.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, if the Council is to deal with the resolution proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union, here and now, I would move: that, in view of the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1950, the Council postpone consideration of the Soviet proposal until the General Assembly has taken action on the question of Chinese representation.

George Hodges Owen Appointed to Inter-American Juridical Committee

The Department of State announced on February 1 that on January 31, 1951, the President appointed George Hodges Owen of New York to serve as member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee at Rio de Janeiro. He will succeed Dr. Alwyn V. Freeman who recently resigned.

The Inter-American Juridical Committee grew out of the Inter-American Neutrality Committee which was established in 1939 by the first consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Panama. It was given its present name by the third consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers held at Rio de Janeiro in 1942.

The Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogotá in 1948, provided that the Inter-American Juridical Committee should be the permanent committee of the Inter-American Council of Jurists.

¹ Made before the Trusteeship Council on Jan. 30 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

The Inter-American Juridical Committee was given several important assignments by the first meeting of the Council of Jurists which met at Rio de Janeiro in May and June of last year. These assignments include study of such subjects as the system of territorial waters and related questions, uniform rules on the sale of personal property, and international cooperation in judicial actions. The Committee also has under study the subject of reservations to multilateral treaties.

Mr. Owen has been serving as an officer in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and has been a specialist on foreign affairs in the Department since 1947.

Comment on Agenda for Fourth Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of American States

[Released to the press January 31]

The communication regarding the proposed revision in Item III (b) of the draft agenda for the fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was, in accordance with instructions from the Department of State, delivered today by John C. Dreier, United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, to Dr. Alberto Lleras, Secretary General of the Organization of American States. The Meeting of Consultation is to convene in Washington March 26, 1951.

The draft agenda for the Meeting of Consultation was drawn up by the Council of the Organization of American States and sent to the Governments for consideration on January 17. Final consideration and approval of the agenda by the Council is scheduled for February 7.

The communication to Dr. Lleras dated January 31 follows.

MY DEAR DR. LLERAS: Under instructions from my Government, I wish to submit the following comment concerning the proposed agenda for the Fourth Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which was transmitted by the Council of the Organization of American States to the Governments on January 17, 1951.

With respect to Point III (b), my Government has taken particular note of the discussions which led up to the adoption of the language of the draft agenda submitted by the Council to the Governments for consideration. It appears that there has been some doubt concerning the scope of this agenda item.

It is the desire of the United States Government to remove all doubt concerning the scope of this item. My Government particularly wishes to make clear that it believes that Item III (b) on

the agenda should permit the discussion, among others, of problems regarding the continuation of basic economic activity and the expansion of basic productive facilities within the limits imposed by the present emergency situation.

My Government recognizes the interest of the other American Republics in plans for increased economic activity. It is manifestly impossible and inappropriate for the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider all aspects of the economic future of the American Republics. However, the Government of the United States considers it appropriate and desirable for the Meeting to discuss frankly both the possibilities and limitations of the present emergency with respect not only to existing economic activities, but to plans for increased production for both civilian and defense purposes.

Accordingly, my Government suggests that Item III (b) on the agenda of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs be revised to read as follows:

"Production and distribution of products and services in short supply to meet, within limits imposed by the emergency, the requirements of the American Republics for the continuation of basic economic activity and expansion of basic productive facilities."

With every good wish, believe me,
Sincerely yours,

JOHN C. DREIER

Paul A. Unger To Attend Tariff Negotiations

The Department of State announced on January 25 that Paul A. Unger, Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior, will attend the third set of tariff negotiations by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade now in session at Torquay, England, representing the Department of the Interior on the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements. William E. S. Flory, the representative of the Department of the Interior on the committee, will be unable to attend, and Mr. Unger will serve as his alternate. Executive Order No. 10170, issued by the President on October 12, 1950, added the Department of the Interior to the eight Government agencies which already had members on the Committee.¹

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 23, 1950, p. 659.

The United States in the United Nations

[February 2-8]

General Assembly

Committee I (Political and Security).—The Committee reconvened on February 2 and took up the three remaining items on its agenda: two U.S.S.R. draft resolutions entitled "United States Aggression against China (Formosa)" and "United States violations of Chinese air space and bombings of Chinese territory" and the United States item on the "Question of Formosa." The chairman stated that the two U.S.S.R. items would be discussed jointly. United States Ambassador Warren R. Austin refuted factually the five Soviet charges of so-called United States "aggression" against China, which were first put before the Committee the latter part of November by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky. United States delegate John Foster Dulles, on that occasion, had denied these charges and had explained briefly the action taken by the United States in connection with Formosa as a result of the Communist attack on Korea. Mr. Dulles also had proposed, on December 15, that Committee I postpone further discussion on Formosa until a later date under better and less complex circumstances than existed at that time due to the mass intervention by the Chinese Communists. This motion was adopted by vote of 53-0-5.

Mr. Austin pointed out that the Soviet representative in the Security Council, September 12, had vetoed a United States resolution calling for an on-the-spot investigation of the complaint of bombing of Chinese territory and that the Security Council had rejected the Soviet charges of aggression against the United States, November 30 by a vote of 1-9-0. He emphasized that the statements made by the President of the United States on June 27 and by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, on June 29, respectively, "make it entirely clear that the United States has no aggressive designs or ambitions—whether political, military or otherwise—with respect to Formosa." In summing up, he said, "I have sought to bring out the facts. We think the Soviet charges will be seen for what they are—a mere fabrication for Soviet purposes. Because of their baselessness, we think the Committee will want to dismiss the charges

promptly and decisively." The Soviet delegate, S. K. Tsarapkin, directed his remarks during this meeting toward contradicting delegate John Foster Dulles' statement of November 27.

The chairman, on February 6, stated a cable had been sent to Peiping, at the request of the Soviet delegate, that Committee I had resumed debate on "Complaint by U.S.S.R. regarding aggression against China by the United States," to which reply had been received saying it was impossible for the People's Republic of China to participate because the Committee had "illegally adopted" the United States resolution branding China as an aggressor. It was requested that Wu Hsiu-Chuan's speech, which he had left with the Secretariat, should be read and circulated as a document. The Soviet delegate submitted a draft resolution condemning "these illegal acts by the Government of the United States" and recommending that the Security Council take immediate action to prevent these acts, which infringed on China's sovereignty.

The Chinese Nationalist delegate, Dr. T. F. Tsiang, declared the Chinese Communist charges were entirely groundless and were part of the world-wide Communist campaign against the United States because it was the leading factor in the world's struggle for freedom.

On February 7, the Soviet bloc continued its harangue against the United States and insisted upon the adoption of the U.S.S.R. resolutions. The chairman declared the discussion closed; the Soviet resolution on the alleged invasion and blockade of Taiwan (Formosa) was rejected 5- (Soviet bloc)-49-3 (Burma, Yugoslavia, Indonesia) and the new resolution condemning "illegal acts" by the United States was rejected by vote of 5-50-2 (Afghanistan, Yugoslavia). The United Kingdom Delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, proposed that discussion of the last agenda item, "Question of Formosa" be deferred in view of the current unsettled situation in the Far East. United States Ambassador Austin stated that, although the matter should remain on the agenda, there was apparently little constructive purpose in discussing it now and therefore agreed to the deferment of debate. The motion was approved 38-5 (Soviet bloc)-8.

Committee on the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information

The Committee completed its 3½ weeks' session on February 7 with the adoption of a 69-page report on a draft convention on freedom of information. This report contains draft proposals covering the preamble and 19 articles for such a convention as well as two resolutions calling for further study of additional proposals for the convention.

In its final resolution, the Committee suggested that member governments, in submitting comments on the draft Convention, also transmit views on the advisability of convening a special conference to complete the convention. These comments will be considered by the Economic and Social Council at its thirteenth session (July), when the Council will decide whether to convene the special conference.

The United States representative, Carroll Binder, in voting on the final report, made it clear that this did not mean that the United States was voting in favor of the proposed convention text. He stated that, had the Committee agreed to his request to put the draft convention as a whole to a vote, he would have been obliged to vote against it. He made it clear that, the United States viewed parts of the text as dangerously vague and certain of the permissive limitations on freedom of information, as not acceptable.

Trusteeship Council

The Council, on February 2, heard report by G. R. Powles, High Commissioner of Western Samoa. Consideration was given to a French draft resolution, "Rural Economic Development of the Trust Territories," which would establish a committee comprising China, Dominican Republic, France, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States to study prevailing policies, laws, and practices regarding land utilization and land alienation and to submit a progress report before the end of the next session. This resolution was adopted, as amended, by vote of 11-0-1 (U.S.S.R.).

The Committee on Organization and Methods of Visiting Missions met February 6 and examined the eight points of the General Assembly resolution of December 2, 1950. It agreed that visiting missions should remain long enough in each territory to be able adequately to fulfill their task; that it would be undesirable to reduce the membership of visiting missions from four members; that a single mission would suffice for West Africa and East Africa, respectively, but that two missions would be desirable for the Pacific area; that each mission should spend 3 months "on the spot" and that the frequency of missions should

continue to be every 3 years; that there should be the greatest flexibility in the itinerary of missions; that the terms of reference of missions should continue to include the examination of specific problems and preliminary examination of petitions; and that the members of each mission should be selected as much as possible from among representatives of the Trusteeship Council.

Economic and Social Council

The Technical Assistance Committee met on February 5 and unanimously reelected Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (India) as chairman. The Soviet representative, S. I. Rassadin, held that the representative of the Republic of China instead of the Chinese National Government should be seated. The United States representative, Isador Lubin, opposed this proposal and stated that the Committee was obliged to abide by the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1950, on the representation question. The chairman ruled that the Committee did not have jurisdiction to consider credentials and was upheld by vote of 11-2 (U.S.S.R., Poland). The second report of the Technical Assistance Board was presented by the chairman, David Owen. He characterized this account of the first four months of the Board's operational experience as evidence of work well begun but cautioned against deducing long-term trends on the basis of figures reported currently.

The United States representative, Isador Lubin, said it was very early to comment critically on what had been done to date or on future plans but voiced the belief that there were certain problems which it would be very helpful for governments to discuss. Good results had been achieved on coordination between the multilateral United Nations and bilateral United States technical assistance programs. The Technical Assistance Board had effectively coordinated agency activities from the point of view of avoiding duplication and developing cooperative working relationships. However, it was the belief of the United States that the Board should do more than this; it should be the instrument to assure that the activities of each agency supplement the activities of the others in meeting the economic development needs of recipient countries.

The Committee adopted a United States resolution (12-0) establishing a three-member (United States, France, India) subcommittee to recommend the specific types of information which should be included in future Board reports. The Committee completed its session on February 7 and authorized the chairman to prepare a report for the Economic and Social Council meeting at Santiago.

International Security and Foreign Relations¹

The combined strength of the free world, in people, in industrial capacity, and in natural resources, greatly exceeds that of the Soviet Union and its satellites. This great strength must be mobilized and organized. Most of all, it must be united in purpose. The Soviet rulers are doing their best to split apart the free nations. If the free world let that happen, we would be handing the Soviet Union a victory without a struggle.

The Soviet rulers since the last war have been devoting a very large percentage of their resources to building military forces greatly in excess of any justifiable defense requirements. If these forces should be unleashed and succeed in conquering Western Europe, the Soviet rulers would more than double the industrial power now in their hands. If the Communist forces should seize other major areas of the world, the Soviet rulers would control vastly increased reservoirs of manpower and raw materials. In either case they would win new strategic bases for further aggression. The key to United States security is to join in building the free world's defenses.

In the joint effort, the citizens of other free countries, like our own citizens, will be making personal sacrifices. Each free nation must make the largest contribution it can to the mutual defense. This Nation has greater industrial strength than the rest of the free world combined, and must therefore provide assistance on a large scale to other nations working with us in the joint defense drive. This assistance will permit the other free nations to accelerate the efforts they are already making with their own resources and their own energies.

I estimate that expenditures of 7.5 billion dollars will be required for all of our international programs in the fiscal year 1952. This total will be 2.7 billion dollars more than the expenditure for international programs in each of the fiscal years 1951 and 1950. In 1952, the great preponderance of total expenditures for military and economic aid will go directly for the rapid build-up of mutual defense forces. More than one-half

¹ Excerpts from the *Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year, ending June 30, 1952*, which is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. at \$4.75 a copy (paper cover).

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

[Fiscal years. In millions]

Program or agency	Expenditures			Recommended new obligational authority for 1952 ¹
	1950 actual	1951 estimated	1952 estimated	
Military and economic assistance (present programs, and proposed legislation).....	\$4,572	\$4,466	\$7,112	\$10,664
Conduct of foreign affairs: Overseas information and education.....	34	57	166	115
Participation in international organizations.....	55	53	35	32
Other State Department activities.....	142	150	148	145
Total.....	4,803	4,726	7,461	\$10,956

¹ This column excludes 47 million dollars of recommended appropriations to liquidate prior year contract authority.

² Includes 1 billion dollars in new lending authority for the Export-Import Bank.

of total expenditures will be for procurement of military equipment to be shipped from this country to our allies. I shall request appropriations of 9.7 billion dollars for these mutual security programs, in addition to an increase of 1 billion dollars now requested in the lending ceiling of the Export-Import Bank. Actual expenditures by the Bank, in the fiscal year 1952 will, of course, be only a fraction of the increase in lending authority.

The complete request for appropriations will be presented to the Congress as soon as remaining details of the program are worked out.

In general, our assistance programs will continue to take two forms—provision of military equipment and provision of economic assistance. But the balance between these two forms of aid will shift very sharply, and will differ according to the strategic, political, and economic situation in each free world area requiring assistance.

Military and economic assistance to Europe.—The heart of our foreign policy in Europe is the North Atlantic Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate on July 21, 1949. Like all international undertakings which endure, this treaty is founded upon mutual interest. Americans know that the survival of this Nation would be gravely imperiled if the free peoples and industrial power of Western Europe were to fall under Commu-

nist subjugation. Correspondingly, the majority of Europeans are fully aware of the interdependence of their security and ours. Over the coming months, the nations of Western Europe will be calling up increasing numbers of their young men for military service. They will be diverting their resources to production of military weapons. They will be imposing additional controls on their civilian economies, particularly on civilian consumption. They will be joining with us, through the joint staff organizations which already exist, in standardizing equipment and training and in strategic and tactical planning. They are placing major elements of their forces under the unified command of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now a going concern. It is backed by an impressive reservoir of skilled people and industrial power. It includes not only the military potential of this country and Canada, but also the combined strength of the nine European members of the North Atlantic Treaty—Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal. These nine nations alone number altogether 175 million people, or almost as many as the Soviet Union. Iceland is also a full participant. Greece and Turkey, which within the past few years have proved their steadfastness under the threat of aggression, are closely associated with the mutual effort.

The power of all these nations, pursuing a common course under the United Nations, is being directed to the creation of highly trained and well-equipped forces-in-being, and a much larger mobilization base. The combined European and American forces will serve as a powerful deterrent to Communists aggression in Europe. There is genuine hope, moreover, that arrangements can soon be completed for German participation in the common defense.

In order to reach the required level of combined strength in the shortest possible time, it will be necessary for the United States to give our European partners considerable assistance. The bulk of this assistance will be in the form of military equipment and supplies. We and our allies are determined that the mutual defense forces shall be equipped with modern and effective weapons. Although the European countries are undertaking to convert a substantial portion of their industries to arms production, they cannot by themselves produce rapidly enough all the complex and expensive weapons needed to arm their forces. Our tremendously productive economy must turn out many of the weapons needed to arm the European forces.

To achieve the rapid increase in European defenses that is necessary, our program of economic aid to Europe must, with a few exceptions—notably the aid program in Austria—be directed to support of the European military build-up, rather than to promoting further general economic ex-

pansion. The progress made to date under the recovery program is standing us and the entire free world in good stead in the present situation. In most European countries industry is now producing at well above prewar peaks, and this enlarged industrial strength can in substantial part be converted to military production. Moreover, the improved lot of the ordinary citizen, made possible in part by the European Recovery Program, has resulted in a higher degree of political cohesion and a firmer resolve to defend democracy and free institutions against aggression.

Western Europe's requirements for economic aid to support her program for building defensive forces arise directly from the disparity between her requirements for essential imports from the dollar area and her ability to earn dollars. In order to move ahead rapidly with defense plans, European countries will require materials and equipment of certain types which they can obtain only from the United States. These supplies include items essential directly in their armament factories, materials for essential consumer goods, foodstuffs, and materials for their most vital export industries. But because these countries will be diverting to rearmament a large proportion of the resources which would otherwise be engaged in producing for export, they cannot for the time being obtain, without help from us, all the dollars needed to pay for these essential dollar imports.

Much remains to be done in the mutual effort to achieve rapid strengthening of European defenses. In general, the commitments made by the European countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have not been large enough up to this time. But these countries share the deep new sense of urgency which recent events have given us, and these difficulties will be rapidly overcome. It must be clearly understood that the military and economic aid which I am recommending to assist European nations to rearm will be conditioned upon their carrying out their full responsibilities for building the defensive strength of the North Atlantic Treaty community. The entire free world is in grave peril. This peril can only be surmounted by arduous joint efforts, in which each nation carries out to the full its allotted responsibilities.

Assistance to other areas of the free world.—The heightened Communist pressures in Asia, the Near East, and other non-European areas require that we accelerate our existing programs of military assistance, which now provide military equipment to certain countries which can use it effectively and are faced by internal and external Communist pressures. However, in comparison with our assistance to Europe, which will be predominantly in the form of military equipment, our total program of assistance to the non-European areas of the free world must place proportionately more emphasis upon building security through helping the people and governments of these areas to solve pressing economic problems.

To varying degrees, in different parts of the non-European free world, the crucial problem in resistance to communism is the attitudes and aspirations of the people. In some of these areas, millions of people live in desperate conditions of poverty, insecurity, ill health, and illiteracy. To them communism may appear as a possible escape from unendurable conditions of life. These people must be given real faith in their future within the free world through concrete evidence that their age-old problems have been recognized and that effective steps are being taken to solve them.

In many of these countries the Governments are increasingly aware of the real problem presented by the low living standards of their people and are taking such steps as they can to deal with this problem. But many of these Governments do not yet have adequate numbers of trained administrators and technical and professional personnel, and lack the capital funds necessary to carry out critical developmental projects. The United States cannot close the gap between reality and aspirations with generalized economic aid, especially in the present period of extreme pressure on our economy. What we can do is to work with these people and their governments to help them solve their problems. By making available to them knowledge and skills to supplement their own, together with modest amounts of loan capital and assistance grants, we can help these governments to bring tangible benefits to their people, and achieve an increase in the unity and resource strength of the free world.

In certain other non-European areas many of the countries have more experienced governments and a better start toward economic development. In these instances, economic and technical assistance can make an important contribution by breaking economic bottlenecks. Often the necessary projects in these areas are suitable for financing through loans.

We do not propose to assist countries where the Governments are not sincerely trying to improve the economic conditions of their people. Our economic and technical assistance will be granted only where it is asked for by national governments which adopt in good faith the policies necessary to make the aid effective, and to make full use of their own resources.

Our total program of economic assistance to non-European areas of the free world will make a major contribution to increasing productivity in agricultural, industrial, and extractive industries. Part of the increased output must go directly to improving living standards and public services. Another part, including raw materials and particularly strategic materials needed for the mutual defense of the free world, can be traded with the more industrialized nations for capital goods needed for further economic development.

In Asia, we are now supplying military equipment to certain nations faced by Communist threats against their independence. We are also

providing economic assistance to help meet urgent problems in various parts of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, Thailand, and Formosa, and a developmental program in the Philippines is being inaugurated. Both military and economic aid may have to be extended to additional Asian countries, and certain present programs will have to be accelerated. In addition, we are continuing our economic assistance to Japan, which is progressing steadily toward self-support.

In the crucial Near East, we are providing military assistance, loan capital, and technical assistance. We are continuing our support of the United Nations efforts to reintegrate the refugees from Palestine. Our assistance to the Near East nations is essential to build up their strength against Communist pressures.

In Africa, developmental and technical assistance programs are being carried out in the overseas territories of the Western European countries, in large part through the use of European Recovery Program counterpart funds. These programs, by improving living standards, will help to curb the growth of Communist pressures and will bring about expanded output of vitally needed strategic materials.

In the Western Hemisphere we are joined with our Latin-American neighbors in a mutual effort to strengthen our combined defenses and to build increased economic strength. The balanced economic development of Latin America has been, and continues to be, an essential objective of American foreign policy. This policy is being supported by the public lending agencies which are providing capital for essential projects for which private financing is not available. The activities of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs in the field of technical cooperation are a demonstration of the practical value of the Point Four concept. It is essential that our lending and technical assistance activities be continued, with a special concentration of effort on projects to develop further the economic base of the Latin-American countries and to facilitate and expand the production of strategic materials vital to the free world in this emergency period.

In many of these areas, extremely important contributions to the total effort are being made by American private capital and nonprofit institutions.

The technical assistance program, administered in part by United Nations agencies, is gaining momentum in many areas, and through small expenditures is making an important contribution to productivity.

A steady outflow of loan capital for critical projects is being maintained by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank. The increased need for undertakings to expand output of defense materials adds to the importance of the functions of the Export-Import Bank at this time. The Bank now has only about 500 million dollars of

uncommitted lending authority. I recommend that the lending authority of the Bank be increased at this time by 1 billion dollars.

Our total program of assistance to non-European areas of the world is making a major contribution to the ability of these areas to withstand internal and external Communist pressures. The recommendations to be sent to the Congress will in part represent a continuation of these going programs, modified to take account of physical limitations of supply in this country, the increased dollar earnings of some of the areas, and the general sharpening of Communist pressures.

Conduct of foreign affairs.—Effective conduct of our foreign relations takes on increasing importance in the critical world situation. The role of the diplomatic forces of the Government is of highest importance in organizing and making effective the mutual defense program. The need for a continuous flow of political and economic intelligence and the heightened tempo of activity in all aspects of international relations places a heavy burden upon the existing facilities of the Government.

This Government in cooperation with others is now organizing international machinery for dealing with world shortages of materials. In order to insure that scarce materials are used in the manner which will best serve the common defense, application of controls over international movements of certain commodities will be required. A substantial portion of world trade will continue, however, through normal markets. In order to carry forward our long-run policy of developing among the free nations workable trade patterns and a greater volume of world trade, I urge the Congress to extend the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

Through the international information and education program, we are carrying to the rest of the world the truth about our own objectives, and exposing the evil objectives of the Communist conspiracy. During the fiscal year 1951, I requested, and Congress approved, a considerable expansion in this activity, including construction of additional overseas radio broadcast facilities in the United States and abroad. I intend to request from the Congress an additional appropriation of 100 million dollars for this purpose during the current fiscal year. The expanded program will result in expenditures of 57 million dollars in fiscal year 1951 and 166 million dollars in fiscal year 1952.

In order that our political, economic, and military efforts may have their maximum effect, our purposes and objectives must be made clear to all. We must promote understanding and unity among the free peoples of the world and instill hope in the hearts and minds of those who have already fallen victim to aggression. Truth is on the side of the free nations of the world. We must make full use of this advantage.

Federal History Program Inaugurated

[Released to the press by the White House January 31]

The President has requested the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to establish a Federal History Program for the agencies engaged in emergency activities. A similar program, operating during World War II, resulted in a number of studies which have been extremely useful in the current mobilization effort, especially in the fields of military procurement, economic stabilization, and expansion of the armed forces. Agency histories prepared by the War Production Board, the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, for example, are currently in great demand.

January 29, 1951

MY DEAR MR. LAWTON: During this period of national emergency, the Federal Government has found that the historical records maintained during the previous periods of emergency have been of great value. The histories of a number of the temporary agencies of World War II have been especially helpful in current mobilization planning.

I believe that we should analyze the development of our present activities while the problems are fresh in the minds of the participants. Such analyses will help us to solve the problems we shall face in the future.

For these reasons, I should like you to establish a Federal history program for all the agencies engaged in emergency activities. The active direction of the program should be undertaken by the Bureau of the Budget, although the preparation of the studies themselves should be carried out by the individual agencies.

In order to be of greatest value, these studies should not give a detailed review of accomplishments, but should concentrate upon the objective analysis of the problems confronted, how they were met, and the reasons underlying policy and administrative decisions. Failures as well as successes should, of course, be included. Historians should have full access to source materials and they should draw upon both written and unwritten sources of information. Agency heads should see that the historians have ready contact with key officials and are enabled to follow decisions on policy and administration as they are made.

I am confident that this program will be useful in improving operations. The studies that result can help orient new officials and give all officials a broader understanding of agency problems and policies. These studies will also assist in the preparation of reports to the Congress. Agency historians, however, should not be diverted into current operations.

It is important to start this program quickly, in order to profit from the lessons we are already learning. I hope that you will report to me from time to time on the progress of the agencies in carrying forward the historical program.

U.S. Organization for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs

by James E. Webb
Under Secretary of State¹

To the layman, like myself, science is a wonderful and, at the same time, a fearful thing. We see the results of science in every phase of our richly diversified national life. In your own field of aeronautics, it is a remarkable experience to take off in a modern aircraft in foul weather and feel absolutely sure there is no cause for concern. It is wonderful for an old-time pilot like me to sit in the cockpit and come in for a landing under full automatic control. You see the rudders move to change course, but no foot is there. You see the throttle move to keep airspeed constant, but no hand is there. And you think back to that first time, before scientific instrumentation, when an undercast cut off your visual contact with mother earth and fear gripped your heart. You remember your first fledgling efforts to fly through a cloud and the inevitable spin down out of it. You remember your first low visibility rule—go down where you can see the ground. And you remember also the thrill and relief of the new rule that came with the gyroscope—go up where there is nothing to hit.

Relation of Aeronautical Scientist to Political Scientist

You, in this Institute, know the potentialities of present-day aeronautical weapons. You know they can penetrate to the most protected place to destroy man's most precious possessions. You know the dimensions of the fearful prospect of living in a world where such weapons are out of control. But, what you can hardly appreciate is the difficulty faced by the political scientist, the expert in international affairs, and the political leader in the efforts they and we all must make to bring these weapons under effective international

restraint. Without such restraint, there can be no real confidence. Without confidence, the institutions basic to our civilization cannot long exist.

Every scientist here, I know, would rather devote his time and effort to the work of peace than to the work of war. But, we live in a time when our need for power to restrain acts intended to destroy us means that the free world must rearm. It must rearm with the most modern weapons, and it must stand together in the face of great danger. We and our friends must build military power that can become, in effect, a shield behind which we can carry forward the work of peace—the work of creating a cooperative international economic, political, and social system adequate to the needs of these times. In such a system, the United States of America will seek no satellites. Our efforts will continue to be for a system based on international cooperation. Our deep desire is not for power over other nations. It is for power together with other nations and peoples.

Now, it has been my experience that scientists speak a more universal language and have more nearly universal habits of work and thought than other groups. Therefore, it may be hard for you here tonight to visualize all the difficulties that flow from the adoption of the simple concept I have mentioned—that the free world must rearm and stand together. Not only different languages but also different forms of political organization and political thought are sizable obstacles. A major hurdle was passed 9 months ago. The North Atlantic Treaty nations, meeting in London, recognized that effective military power must rest on a more secure foundation than a plan to coordinate independent forces controlled by a number of nations. They adopted the concept of a balanced collective force to defend against aggression. Later, meeting in Brussels, they adopted the concept of an integrated European army. To make this concept a reality is the task now being spearheaded by General Eisenhower. It will be a part of your work, for a long time, to help him.

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences at New York, N.Y. on Jan. 29 and released to the press on the same date. For full text, see Department of State press release 72.

You must invent new and better aeronautical weapons, and mass-produce the ones already invented. When this is done, perhaps aviation and you can return to the work closest to your hearts—drawing the ends of the earth closer together in the work of peace.

In solving the problems of collective security, the international political scientist cannot employ the precise techniques that you use in the physical sciences. He cannot set up, in parallel, five different projects to test five possible solutions. If he selects for his first effort the most promising one of the five, and it proves a failure, he cannot then select a second and start it from the same base. In his field, every experiment starts from a new base. If the United States fails to ratify and support the League of Nations, the *status quo ante* cannot be restored a few years later. If our present efforts to create an integrated European army are not successful, an entirely different set of basic conditions will face us sometime in the future as we strive to build other institutions of collective security. But, with all the difficulties, in spite of inability to precisely control and measure our experiments, real progress is being made. The science of political organization, the science of management of large affairs, is getting in its constructive work.

Foreign Affairs Organization

This is particularly true in the organization and administration of foreign affairs in the Department of State. As our Government is organized in the field of foreign affairs, this Department is roughly comparable to what you in the aviation industry might conceive as a combination of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Wright Field, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the Douglas, Lockheed, North American and Boeing Companies, with United, Curtiss-Wright, and an airline thrown in for good measure. In other words, it is the heart of our effort for international cooperation and peace. It is the center of a process far more intricate than what we once called our "shirtsleeves diplomacy"—the process of saying where we stood so that the world could take it or leave it.

Two years ago, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, popularly known as the Hoover Commission, reported as follows, and I should like to quote somewhat at length:

The time is particularly appropriate to appraise the machinery of the Government for the conduct of foreign affairs. The United States emerged from the recent World War with a radically new role in world affairs. As a result, today's organization requirements are drastically different from those of the prewar era. The executive branch today finds itself forced to develop positive foreign policies and programs, involving not merely the State Department but many other departments and agencies as well, and to deal cooperatively with other nations on a multilateral as well as a bilateral basis.

The Congress, in addition, finds that the exercise of its traditional powers in the domestic as well as in the international field has made it a participant in the conduct of foreign affairs on an unprecedented scale.

The problems of Government organization for the conduct of foreign affairs are, therefore, not confined to the State Department alone but involve the organization of the Presidency, the State Department and the Foreign Service, the departments and agencies other than the State Department, the interdepartmental relationships, and the relationships between the executive and legislative branches. . . . Accompanying the involvement of all these elements and contributing to the complexities of the situation is the increased size of the Government as a whole and of the State Department in particular.

Again, this Commission stated:

The conduct of foreign affairs today involves almost the entire executive branch—the President, the President's executive offices, the State Department, numerous other departments and agencies, and intricate interdepartmental machinery. In addition, it involves constant cooperation between the executive branch and the Congress. As a consequence the problems of organization are equally government-wide in scope.

Most of you will remember that Secretary of State Acheson served as Vice Chairman of the Hoover Commission. He actively participated in the Commission's work on foreign affairs.

As head of the State Department, almost his first act was to inaugurate the reforms which were within his power and to request legislation for the balance. This legislation, Public Law 73 of the 81st Congress, was enacted and became effective in May 1949—just 20 months ago.

Since that time, the Department has been completely reorganized. Policy formulation and control have been centralized. Operations have been decentralized. The coordination of the 45 agencies of the Government dealing with foreign affairs has been improved. And, even if some of you may be inclined to doubt this, relations with the Congress are really much better.

A new science program has been added to encourage the interchange of scientific information and assist scientists in establishing and maintaining contacts abroad. Where our foreign Embassies and missions have heretofore had commercial attachés, military attachés, civil air attachés, financial attachés, and agricultural attachés, a number of them now have a new addition—a science attaché. He will report on significant trends and developments and will assist in the collection, evaluation, and exchange of scientific information.

In broad outline, the United States organization for the conduct of foreign affairs is quite simple. The world is divided into four parts, and four Assistant Secretaries are assigned to cover them. Since the United Nations and its specialized organizations now play such a large part in our operations, we have a fifth Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs. Our relations with Germany differ markedly from other foreign affairs problems, so we keep them separate in a Bureau of German Affairs. In our international infor-

mation program, we will within a few months be conducting the largest radio broadcasting operation in the world. Each year in our educational exchange program we arrange with other nations for the exchange of over 5,000 people. These two programs are both large and interrelated, so we combine them under a general manager. The Point 4 Program is operated through a separate office, as is the International Security Program, including military assistance to other nations. Therefore, you can see, in broad outline, that we have in the State Department what you might call 9 operating vice presidents. Under them, we have some 300 Embassies and missions throughout the world. To them come, almost every day, for negotiation or discussion, many of the Ambassadors and Ministers of the 73 foreign nations which maintain missions in the city of Washington at our seat of Government. Is there a problem important to an American citizen anywhere in the world? If so, it is very likely to be communicated through one of our 300 missions to one of our 9 operating vice presidents whose duty it is to see that the proper agency of the Government knows about it and takes appropriate action. Does a King or a Prime Minister desire to send an urgent message to the President? His Ambassador calls on the proper operating vice president, or the Secretary of State himself, who accepts and delivers the message and arranges for a prompt answer.

Volume of Business Handled

Are you thinking, at this point, that the volume of business handled by the State Department must be tremendous? The answer is that the volume is tremendous. In and out of the Department will go tonight roughly a thousand cables important enough to be put in our secret codes. This thousand cables will represent many more words that have to be encoded and decoded tonight than will be handled in plain English tonight out of Washington by the Associated Press. In addition to this volume of cable traffic, the Department will handle this month over a quarter of a million other reports and documents. As I said earlier, our broadcast operations are larger than NBC or CBS. The military assistance program, handled by one of our nine vice presidents, has appropriated to it for this year the sum of 5 billion 200 million dollars. Sometimes, to emphasize the importance of these nine vice-presidents, I have said that the job of each one is more important than was that of the Secretary of State 10 years ago. Perhaps that is an exaggeration, but certainly each one is a very important officer of our Government.

Now, to those of you who have studied the complexities of large operations, it is clear that I have made only passing reference to what is perhaps the most difficult organizational problem of all—that of translating the special-interest con-

cerns of the nine operating vice presidents into general foreign policy. We have had to find a way, also, of avoiding the kind of situation in which a progressive series of decisions made to meet an urgent special-interest concern would lead us on into an undesirable general policy position. This we accomplish through the use of Department-wide functional and policy advisory staffs. For example, take the field of economic foreign policy. While each of the nine vice presidents must take account of the economic aspects of the policies and programs being carried out in his area, it is the job of another and different kind of officer—the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs—to see that the sum total of economic activities of all nine vice presidents adds up to a sound and workable foreign economic policy. It is also his job to do the staff work necessary to lay plans to maximize the effectiveness of our economic power in the accomplishment of our international objectives. Incidentally, this officer also handles aviation affairs. Under his supervision are administered the 110 bilateral and 8 multilateral aviation agreements now in force. Also the 15 international aviation conferences, in which the United States participated in 1950, were a part of his responsibility—more than one aviation conference a month.

Although I have used the field of economic affairs as an illustration, the same general description applies in the other four functional fields of Public Affairs, Congressional Relations, Intelligence, and Administration. All are further integrated and tied together through a high-level policy planning staff. Thus, we have arranged for centralization of policy formulation and control without losing the substantial benefits of a decentralization of operations.

The Meaning of Foreign Relations

Where does all this lead in our search for international cooperation as a foundation for world peace?

First of all, we must recognize that the conduct of foreign relations includes many activities in addition to diplomatic negotiation. We have vital interests in all parts of the world. We are engaged in a number of very large, difficult, and expensive programs calculated to achieve foreign policy objectives. These programs must be effectively organized and administered.

Second, the conduct of foreign relations is not only with individual nations but increasingly with groups of nations. Decisions on matters of foreign policy which ostensibly relate to one foreign nation cannot be made without considering their possible impact on other nations. Arrangements for such multilateral negotiation and cross-checking are essential.

Third, we increasingly find that there is no clear line of demarcation between foreign affairs and domestic affairs. Participation in decisions and

actions affecting the foreign field is required of many individual citizens as well as many executive departments and agencies heretofore concerned almost exclusively with domestic matters. The Department of State must be prepared to provide coordination for these new and unaccustomed activities.

Fourth, under our Constitutional system, with its division of powers, the President has a large measure of responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs. But the responsibilities of Congress are also broad.

The Senate has jurisdiction over confirmation of appointments and over the ratification of treaties. The Congress has responsibility in policy formulation, the appropriation of funds, the regulation of foreign commerce, the fixing of import duties, and the declaration of war. In foreign policy development and implementation, we must have close coordination of the Executive and Legislative branches.

These four fundamentals are important to every citizen, and particularly to leaders of thought in the new fields like aeronautical science. In proportion as we recognize them and use energy, skill, perseverance, science, and faith, to solve the problems which they raise, we will speed up progress toward international cooperation and world peace.

As I conclude, may I return to the thought with which I began—science is a wonderful and at the same time a fearful thing. As we, in the United States, join with other nations to put first things first and move urgently forward to build military power, let us never forget that there are international problems in this world which will remain when the threat of aggression is gone. The wonderful side of science will show itself full and complete when it can move on to help solve these postaggression problems. The end we must always seek is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all men everywhere.

Departmental Organization for Coordination of Country and Commodity Requirements¹

1. Establishment of Departmental Organization

a. To carry out the Department's responsibilities resulting from the Defense Production Act of 1950 for the review and coordination of country and commodity requirements for foreign economic programs to be submitted to United States Government allocating agencies, the functions and organizational arrangements indicated below are established in the Department, effective this date.

b. The Department of State will not establish or determine individual commodity or country requirements, but will review such requirements data developed by other agencies to advise them on foreign policy considerations and will expedite priorities for programs deemed vital to the accomplishment of United States foreign policy objectives.

¹ Effective January 29, 1951.

2. Relationship to Existing Components

The officials and units added to existing organizations shall function as integral components of the Department, pursuant to their terms of reference and those of other components of the Department as prescribed below and in the Manual of Regulations and Procedures, Volume II, Organization.

3. Responsibilities of Economic Affairs Area

The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs shall:

a. Screen, assemble and correlate commodity information from the regional bureaus, the Bureau of United Nations Affairs and the Office of Director, International Security Affairs to compare export commodity requirements with available supplies for export.

b. Maintain liaison for guidance purposes with claimant agencies on over-all export requirements and represent the Department on advisory committees of the allocating agency (or agencies) to advise on foreign policy considerations.

4. Responsibilities of the Regional Bureaus

a. Each regional bureau shall:

(1) Obtain recommended requirements by commodity and by country and review such for foreign policy considerations and in the light of other information available to it.

(2) Adjust and assemble commodity requirements for the geographic area for presentation to the intra-departmental Export Requirements Committee, and provide a member of that committee.

(3) Adjust requirements by commodity and by country as necessary because of over-all adjustments made by the Export Requirements Committee and the allocating agency (or agencies).

(4) Maintain liaison as necessary with the appropriate offices of claimant agencies to assure consideration of departmental views in the formulation and implementation of export requirements by such agencies.

b. There may be established in each regional bureau a Requirements Officer to supervise or coordinate the performance of the above functions and to provide bureau representation for requirements committee work.

5. Responsibilities of Bureau of United Nations Affairs

The Bureau of United Nations Affairs shall be responsible for the functions prescribed in paragraph 4, above, insofar as they are applicable to programs with which it is concerned. The Bureau of United Nations Affairs shall be represented on the Export Requirements Committee to advise on the relationship of particular programs to the operations of United Nations agencies and the appropriate utilization of the facilities of these agencies.

6. Responsibilities of the Director, International Security Affairs

The Director, International Security Affairs shall:

a. Maintain liaison with the Economic Cooperation Administration on items other than military end use items, and with the Department of Defense on military end use items, concerning requirements for materials under mutual defense and international security programs.

b. Appoint a representative to the Export Requirements Committee, provide information to this committee on materials requirements for military production in countries with military production programs and make such representations as it considers appropriate with respect to other requirements which appear to it essential for support of defense efforts abroad.

7. Establishment of Export Requirements Committee (ERC)

a. An intra-departmental Export Requirements Committee is established with representation from each re-

gional bureau, the Office of Director, International Security Affairs, the Intelligence and Economic areas, the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and other offices as required. The Chairman of this Committee shall be appointed by the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

b. This Committee shall:

(1) Examine information on materials requirements and advise the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs on amounts of commodities for each geographic area and total export requirements.

(2) Review all foreign requirements except those established by the Director, International Security Affairs for (a) military end use items, and (b) for materials directly required for military production if the appropriate allocating agency grants without further review production priorities or export quotas for requirements so established.

(3) Advise (a) the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs on departmental positions to be taken by the Department's representatives on committees advisory to the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Defense Production Administration or other mobilization control, programming, or allocating agencies, (b) the economic area in its representations to the allocating agency (or agencies) and to the claimant agencies on total export quotas, and (c) the Requirements Officers of regional bureaus in their representations to claimant agencies on country export quotas.

c. The Director, International Security Affairs shall provide the committee with such information concerning requirements mentioned in 7b(2)(b) above as needed to facilitate its work.

d. If agreement is not reached by this committee, the matter shall be immediately referred to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs for decision. If decision can not be reached at the Assistant Secretary level, the matter shall be referred to the Under Secretary in accordance with the prescribed action process.

e. Secretariat services shall be provided by the Committee Secretariat.

Executive Order 10208 Provides Administration of Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950, approved December 29, 1950 (Public Law 897, 81st Cong.), and the act of August 8, 1950 (Public Law 673, 81st Cong.), and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to perform the functions and exercise the powers and authority vested in the President by the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950.

2. Of the funds heretofore appropriated to carry out the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 137), as amended, \$37,800,000 are withdrawn from the Economic Cooperation Administration and are transferred to the Department of Agriculture to be administered under the said Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950 as directed by the Secretary of State.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 25, 1951.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

¹ 16 Fed. Reg. 709.

THE CONGRESS

Public Law 897 Provides Emergency Assistance to Yugoslavia

An act to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950".

SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this Act.

SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this Act.

(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States; and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.

(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this Act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

(d) To make equitable distribution to the people in Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this Act, as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources, without discrimination as to race or political or religious belief.

(e) Whenever relief supplies furnished under this Act are sold for local currency by the Government of Yugoslavia, to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children, and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be mutually agreed upon.

(f) To take all appropriate economic measures to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of food stuffs within Yugoslavia and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

SEC. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this Act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities in the possession of the Commodity Credit Corporation at prices authorized by section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

SEC. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government

shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this Act.

SEC. 6. At the termination of each three-month period after aid has been extended under this Act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said three-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this Act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

SEC. 7. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this Act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

SEC. 8. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this Act without charge against appropriated funds.

SEC. 9. At least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this Act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels, if available.

SEC. 10. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this Act, or is diverting from the purpose of this Act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds termination is desirable.

Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered.

Approved December 29, 1950.

Congressional Interest in Information Activities

[Released to the press February 3]

The State Department welcomes the great interest of Senator Benton and of other Members of Congress who have recently spoken on the subject of the Department's activities in the information field. The Department not only welcomes but also is eager for an opportunity to lay before appropriate representatives of Congress the full story of the great progress that has been made in the world-wide Campaign of Truth.

We feel that the appropriation made a few months ago by the Congress has enabled our information services to move forward with a vig-

orous and effective campaign. We are ready to demonstrate the steps we have taken to work with the nations of the free world in meeting our common challenge today. After such representatives of the Congress have been acquainted with the full facts, they will be in a good position to form conclusions as to what additional measures, if any, should be taken and whether the present organizational arrangements are proper.

We feel sure that any such broad and objective study of the present program will convince them that very great progress has been made in the last few months. We would also welcome any proposals which might be developed as to how the job could be done more effectively.

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